CTC Quarterly Bulletin

3d Qtr, FY 00, No. 01-9, APR 01



"Public Affairs Annex:
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Techniques and Procedures

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1327

FOREWORD

This CTC Quarterly Bulletin focuses on Techniques and Procedures your unit can use, so you have the best chance to "do it right the first time." If the lessons in this bulletin and subsequent CTC Quarterly Bulletins help you avoid making a mistake, then the lessons learned process is working well.

The relevant lessons for the Total Army are there in the field with you. CALL has the mission and the means to share those lessons with the rest of the U. S. Army. This bulletin is one way to do that.

If you or your unit have a "lesson" that could help other units do it right the first time, send it to us. Don't worry about how polished your "article" is. CALL can take care of the editing, format and layout. We just want the raw material that can be packaged, and then shared with everyone.

So take the time to put your good ideas on paper and then get them to CALL. We'll acknowledge receipt and then work with you to put your material in publishable form. It may show up in ***News From the Front!,*** a bimonthly publication, or in the ***CTC Quarterly Bulletin.*** Select material will also be put "on line" in ***Training Techniques,*** a new publication on the CALL Home Page.

You can **fax** your material to **DSN 552-9583/Coml (913) 684-9583, ATTN: Mr. Rick Bogdan, Military Analyst.**

Combat Training Center (CTC) *"HOW TO"* Video Tapes

CALL is distributing CTC-produced "How To" tapes (see the current list at the back of this publication) at no cost. These are standard VHS video cassettes. As subsequent tapes are released by the CTCs, CALL will distribute them. In future publications, we will update the list of available tapes. You can order these tapes as you would any CALL publication, *BUT* the videos will be issued on a unit, not individual, basis. As with any product CALL produces, we highly encourage local reproduction of these tapes. The video tapes are also available for viewing on the CALL Website (http://call.army.mil).

Is Your Unit Looking for Operations Orders to Facilitate Practicing the MDMP? Well, *Look No Further!*

Recent trends from JRTC, NTC, and CMTC reveal that units typically experience problems with the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Brigades often do not have the opportunity to exercise their staff planning process as often as necessary while at home station. CALL has received permission from NTC and JRTC to disseminate, upon request, Division-level operation orders. The orders are designed to be used by a Brigade Headquarters to train a portion of, or the entire, MDMP. They can also be used to facilitate unit CPXs, simulation exercises, or OPDs. If your brigade is interested in using these orders, check out our Customer Service Section at the back of this publication.

Combat Training Center (CTC)
Quarterly Bulletin
3QFY00

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The intent of CALL publications is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) observed and reported in this publication are written by soldiers for soldiers. If you have, or your unit has, identified other relevant TTP for the U.S. Army, contact the Managing Editor, Mr. Rick Bogdan, at Coml (913) 684-9581or DSN 552-9581; FAX DSN 552-9583; e-mail: <bogdanr@leavenworth.army.mil>. Articles must be submitted in either Word Perfect or Word format. Graphs, slides and clipart must be submitted separately from the document in either ppt, pcx or wpg format.

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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



STREETFIGHTING: The Rifle Platoon in MOUT

by CPT John W. Karagosian, O/C, Task Force 1, JRTC

"(Streetfighting) is a bad misnomer, because the last place you see any sane man is in a street where every yard is usually covered by a well-sited machine gun. It should be called house-to-house fighting, which it literally is." --Denis Johnston, BBC Correspondent, *On the Front Lines,* John Ellis, pg 90

LT Smith and 3d Platoon, Company C, are on orders to deploy to Cortina and are determined to get ready. Enemy forces have been reported to be raiding local villages and towns, and operations in urban terrain are a real possibility. Maximizing available training time, 3d Platoon hones their marksmanship skills on a nearby quick-fire range. They then work on individual tasks and room-clearing drills until each fire team and squad are proficient at clearing and marking rooms. Prior to deploying, they rehearse numerous iterations in a live-fire tire house. Confidence is high.

Shortly after deploying in-country, the wily Cortina Liberation Force (CLF) launch an attack on the nearby village of Shughart-Gordon. As part of the brigade attack, 3d Platoon is assigned to clear building 13, OBJ ROCK, the company objective. As the attack progresses, word comes down from the company commander, CPT Hooah, that the attack by 1st Platoon, the company lead element, is in trouble. 1st Platoon has failed to clear building 11 and is combat ineffective. 3d Platoon is going to have to clear buildings 11and 12 enroute to OBJ ROCK.

LT Smith advances to building 10 and takes a quick look at enemy-held building 11. He brings up 2d Squad and his two M240s and begins to suppress the building. Mortar fire begins to land behind him, inflicting casualties on hapless 3d Squad, bringing up the rear. 1st Squad assaults the building and gains a foothold, although they lose half their number to previously unseen riflemen firing from the other side of the street in 2d Platoon's sector. The intrepid SSG Hardcore, assault squad leader, dynamically supervises his men as they clear the building, noting from the open door in the back of the house that some of the enemy have escaped.

LT Smith never makes it to building 11. He is wounded by a CLF rifleman and crawls to find cover. He sees a fellow lieutenant from Bravo company leading a squad of reinforcements around the north side of building 10. The stack of Americans huddles against the wall, getting ready to make its move as rifle fire echoes from across the street.

Hue City. Beirut. Mogadishu. Grozny. Since the end of the World War II, the population of the world and its conflicts have increasingly moved from the rural countryside to modern cities and urban sprawl. The U.S. Army has found itself on this new battlefield, and greater training emphasis is shifting to these likely future conflicts. There is no end in sight to the Army's increasing commitment to this role.

For today's infantryman, training in military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT) sites and tire houses is a more frequent occurrence than before. One of the most elaborate training events at the JRTC is the fight at Shughart-Gordon, where a brigade combat team attacks to secure a Cortinian village and return it to host-nation

control. This fight, as is so often the case in MOUT, hinges on the ability of rifle squads, platoons, and companies to successfully accomplish their respective collective tasks. The comments by Mr. Denis Johnston (see quote on page 1) notwithstanding, many rifle platoons at the JRTC are challenged at getting from one building to the next. At the platoon level, MOUT can be an intense, violent, and short experience that can quickly render the unit combat ineffective. Usually, a majority of casualties occur not in the buildings themselves, but while crossing the deadly ground outside and between buildings. This article will examine some of the recent trends, and propose possible tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to aid a platoon training for future MOUT operations.

Prior to examining problems for the rifle platoon, we must first consider the terrain. Buildings in the urban setting provide excellent cover against small arms rounds or concealment that masks sandbagging and other force protection steps taken by the defender. With the exception of downtown cities, buildings are usually separated by open streets and sidewalks that provide little to no cover for the attacker. On the other hand, excellent fields of fire are available for the defender, although engagement distances are almost always 100 meters or less. Because adjacent buildings are much closer than 100 meters to each other, seizing a foothold in one will probably require suppression or obscuration of several buildings. For the defender, winning the MOUT fight requires making the fight as unfair as possible in the first place. A good way to do this is to defend from buildings that provide cover and concealment from friendly weapons, and fields of fire into streets and engagement areas that offer the attacker no cover at all. This setting results in time-consuming, deliberate operations that require a high expenditure of ammunition and resources to suppress the enemy. The alternative is expenditure of our most precious resource, our soldiers.

At the platoon level, there are several "fights" we must win to survive in MOUT. For riflemen and team leaders, the fight is to seize a foothold in a given building and clear individual rooms. At the squad level, the fight is for a floor or a single small building. The platoon fight revolves around larger buildings, and small city blocks. At all levels of this fight, we will be crossing open areas and securing footholds. The platoon level is the lowest level where we begin to see enough combat power to assault buildings while still being able to suppress as well as provide all around, 360^0 security. This fight requires coordination gained through fire control and distribution, sectors of fire, and fire and maneuver tailored to a MOUT environment. The team leader/squad leader fight frequently focuses on close quarter battle (CQB) tactics to clear rooms and to assault streets. The squad requires support from the platoon to be set up for success.

Commonly, however, platoons at home station focus on the inside-the-building (i.e., the CQB, room to room) fight. They accomplish this part successfully. Unfortunately, they are often heavily attrited while moving to a building. Remember**, the majority of casualties in MOUT take place outside the building, where cover and concealment are least available.** Casualties of 70 percent outside buildings in the village of Shughart-Gordon are not uncommon. The "high payoff" TTPs to survive outside are the ones we train on the least. Conversely, by building MOUT training plans that span only from individual to team and squad levels (rarely progressing to the outside fight), we set our junior leaders up for failure before we even begin. Training on room clearing at the expense of entering and moving between buildings does little good if we fail to secure the room.

Generally speaking, there are three weapons systems that cause almost all casualties among rotational units in the MOUT attack. They are: mines and booby traps, indirect fire (usually 82mm mortars), and direct fire from small arms. Direct fire, the biggest casualty producer, is commonly caused by:

a). Direct fire at a soldier clearing a building, or fire directed at a stationary soldier inside a friendly-held building.

b). Enemy soldiers inside a building defending themselves from a friendly assault (friendly troops in the open).

c). Enemy soldiers in a building engaging friendly forces in the open. The friendly troops are attacking a different building, or otherwise unaware of the source of the fire.

Items b) and c) are situations on which soldiers routinely spend the least time training; we should not be surprised that these two situations result in the majority of our losses.

Put another way, two to three out of every four casualties are caused when soldiers are not clearing or moving inside buildings. To reduce casualties and increase the chances for mission success, we must either:

a). Avoid those areas where casualties are most likely to occur.
b). If we can't avoid danger areas, spend as little time in them as possible.
c). Implement TTPs to better protect soldiers moving through high risk areas.

Our vision of this battlefield is part of the problem.

Consider Battle Drill Six, Enter and Clear a Building (ARTEP 7-8 Drill). The condition for this task states: "The platoon is moving when it receives fire from the enemy *in a building.*" In this example, all elements not assaulting are in SBF positions oriented on the objective building (See Figure 1 on page 4). This technique will work if the enemy does not have mutual support from elsewhere, i.e., a single, isolated building. If there are enemy nearby, we have not considered they could be a real threat to our assault.

Yet in the following example, we see the problem taken a step further. In Figure 2 on page 5 **(FM 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas),*** we see a company attacking an enemy strongpoint, labeled as building 26. With the exception of one squad in building 12, all supporting fires (two rifle platoons, a rifle squad, and two tanks) are oriented solely on the objective building from corners D to A to B.

How is this a problem? It's a problem because in the close confines of the MOUT battlefield, an avenue of approach leading to an objective building can almost always be observed by several adjacent structures, which can also be enemy-occupied. By focusing fires and observation on the objective building only, we invite destruction from surprise fire delivered by an alert enemy providing mutual support from nearby. We are then slow to react to this new threat, resulting in multiple casualties in the assault teams as they seek to create a foothold. Taken to an extreme, it is not uncommon at Shughart-Gordon to see a fire team or squad destroyed while assaulting an empty building.

In Figure 3 on page 6, we see two platoons clearing a street. The enemy is defending three buildings with a reinforced squad. Their positions offer mutual support, and their sectors of fire include short range, frontal fire between buildings (dashed lines), as well as flanking and oblique fire from the sides of buildings (thick lines). Note that the defenders on the east side of building 11 and west side of building 23 are masked from the fire of the friendly platoon that "owns" that building. The enemy crossfire refuses to respect our platoon boundaries. As can be seen, a "by-the-book" technique will probably result in heavy casualties in the open areas west of buildings 11 and 22.



Figure 1. Platoon Attack (ARTEP 7-8 Drill)



Figure 2. Company Attack (FM 90-10-1)



Figure 3. Example of Defensive Sectors in MOUT

Fire without movement is indecisive. Exposed movement without fire is disastrous. There must be effective fire combined with skillful movement. --George C. Marshall, *Infantry in Battle*

The underlying purpose behind our direct and indirect fires is to allow our assault teams and squads to secure a foothold on the objective building. Suppressing the building itself supports the effort. Suppression of the adjacent enemy buildings may also be required. It doesn't matter if we suppress the objective building if other enemy are left unengaged. At the close engagement ranges so common in MOUT, unseen and unengaged enemy can unhinge our plan.

Fire control is very important here. Leaders control fires. If we do not control the fires of our soldiers, they will direct their fires in one of several possible ways: at the closest target, the most obvious target (the one whose muzzle flash they see clearly), or where the fire around them seems to be directed. The result is tunnel vision, which makes the unseen flanking fire from buildings 11 and 23 so dangerous.

Let's look at 1st platoon and the assault on building 11. A common set of tasks/purpose statements used at the JRTC normally follows this type of instruction:

1st squad (ME): secures foothold in building 11 to allow plt to secure building 11.
2d squad: suppresses building 11 to allow 1st squad to secure foothold in building 11.
3d squad: suppresses building 11 to allow 1st squad to secure foothold in building 11.
Weapons squad: suppresses building 11 to allow 1st squad to secure foothold in building 11.

However, if the majority of our casualties in MOUT take place outside the building (fact), then the decisive point in our fight will be maneuvering our assault squad across the open area. Maneuvering the assault squad to its entry point will probably make our attack successful. The underlying purpose to our fires and our suppression should be less on solely engaging the objective and more on protecting friendlies crossing the street, open area, or gap between buildings. This requires good fire distribution. The end state is to mass the effects of our fires. Twenty soldiers suppressing two soldiers in one building is not massing the fire effects. Twenty soldiers simultaneously suppressing 10 soldiers in three buildings is massing fire effects. We'll look at how to do this later.

Let's focus on the route to the OBJ and *protecting the route from enemy fire.*

There are three steps at the platoon level to a deliberate attack in MOUT:

- ☞ **Isolate the building.**
- ☞ **Secure a foothold.**
- ☞ **Clear the building methodically (FM 90-10-1).**

Isolate: Isolate is the first step in seizing a building. Isolation is defined in FM 90-10-1 as "seizing terrain that dominates the area so the enemy cannot supply or reinforce the defenders. There are two ways, basically, to isolate a building. We can do it by completely surrounding the building on all sides, or we can do it with fire. Fire is easier, faster, and far more common. By advancing to the flanks of the building, we can use interlocking fire to prevent the enemy from reinforcing or retreating. If we don't do this, the enemy can easily reinforce the building under attack, or withdraw and fight another day if threatened. Isolation is very important if we are going to use second-story entry techniques, and fight "top down." Isolation of the objective allows us to use the terrain to our

advantage. We push the defender out of his building, where he has cover and concealment, into the open where he has neither and can be easily destroyed. This requires good adjacent unit coordination and cross-talk. In limited visibility operations, it requires us to use our NVGs and weapon sights to their full capability. The night, which makes it easy for us to approach and gain entry, makes it easier for the enemy to escape as well. (See Figure 4 on page 9.)

Mortars are another way to isolate a building with fire. Close-in fires can prevent the enemy from moving in and around the objective. We still must secure a position that allows us to observe the rear of the building to provide observed fires. If not, we will need ammunition to fire continuously, and should plan accordingly.

Securing a foothold: First, we must identify where we want the foothold to be. We do this by designating the entry point for the building. Next, we must identify the route from our last covered and concealed, or assault, position, to the building. This is usually the shortest distance, immediately across the adjacent street, backyard, or alley. A critical step at this point is to ask ourselves, "From what enemy-held buildings can the enemy observe my avenue of approach?" We must then orient observation and fires on those points to break the mutual support between enemy positions. One of the most common situations that results in casualties in Shughart-Gordon is when a soldier is exposed by enfilade fire. The enemy fire can be from a building adjacent to the one the soldier is assaulting that is not covered by friendly fire. The enemy will not advertise his positions to us. However, he will hold his fire to draw us into the open. If adjacent buildings offer fields of fire to our assault route, we must be prepared to cover them with observation and fire. Being able to predict suspected enemy positions by reading the terrain is an important skill to develop.

Maneuvers that are possible and dispositions that are essential are indelibly written on the ground. Badly off, indeed, is the leader who is unable to read this writing. His lot must inevitably be one of blunder, defeat, and disaster. --George C. Marshall, *Infantry in Battle*

By looking at our avenue of approach to the entry point from the enemy perspective, we can determine which buildings and suspected positions are the greatest threat. We then assign sectors of fire that direct friendly shooters at the identified enemy-held buildings.

Do not forget that the purpose behind assigning these sectors of fire is to allow the assault team to obtain a foothold of a room in a building. We have to suppress the building, *and* protect the soldiers along the avenue of approach (i.e., crossing the street or open area). There will be many buildings within 100 meters of our building and the one we are assaulting. These buildings may offer great vantage points not covered by adjacent platoons. The narrow sectors of fire that result from hiding in the recesses of a window or shooting from through a loophole mean nearby elements may not be of much help. Remember to pay special attention to multi-story buildings that offer good vantage points for snipers and forward observers. These are especially valuable to the defenders and are likely to house enemy in force.



Figure 4: 1st and 2d Platoon isolate Building 11.

This planning takes time. It takes time to identify the enemy buildings, designate sectors of fire, and make sure everyone understands the plan. Ideally, for a deliberate attack, we can use this time while conducting troop-leading procedures in our assembly area. If not, we will have to do it under fire. Moving across an open area to assault a building is one of the most dangerous events in MOUT. In this case, remember the sequence slow-fast-slow: slow, detailed planning with dissemination of the plan to squad and team leaders, fast movement across enemy kill zones, (supported by fire) and slow, thorough clearing of the enemy-held building. It is better to spend the time necessary while covered and concealed in a friendly building than out bleeding in the street. A thorough plan disseminated while the platoon is in the relative safety of a building will result in speed traversing the gap. A hasty plan poorly disseminated will not set the conditions for success, but will result in excess time spent in the open, casualties, and possible mission failure. Another platoon or squad will have to clear our building for us, which in the end, will take more time than if we did it right the first time. Looking at our example, Figure 5 on page 11, a different set of tasks and purposes would be:

1st squad (ME): secures foothold in building 11 to allow plt to secure building 11.
2d squad: suppresses building 23 to allow 1st squad to secure foothold in building 11.
3d squad: suppresses building 22 to allow 1st squad to secure foothold in building 11.
Weapons squad: suppresses building 11 to allow 1st squad to secure foothold in building 11.

Breaching. There are two types of obstacles we might face, existing and reinforcing. At the platoon level, the most common types of obstacles are 1) mined wire obstacles emplaced by the enemy outside the building and 2) The doorway, window or wall we must pass through to seize the foothold itself.

Remember the part about designating an entry point? The best way to enter, ROE permitting, is to make our own hole through the wall. Next best is a window, doors being least preferred. If the friendly and enemy-held buildings are adjoining, "mouseholing" with demolitions is preferable. Otherwise, AT4s, LAWs or other munitions should be used from the safety of our own building, rather than going out into the open to emplace explosives by hand. An effective technique, and one used by Chechens in Grozny in 1994, is to task-organize "rocket teams" under an NCO. Using pair or volley technique, a breach can be rapidly made and provide the enemy the least time in advance as a warning. Hollow-charge weapons in general are not designed to breach walls and one may not be enough. High explosive warheads (such as those in the AT8, SMAW, and Carl Gustav) have better ability to breach masonry. Main gun rounds from tanks are very effective.

Our casualties in the assault itself will be proportional to the intensity of enemy fire, its accuracy, and how long our assault teams are exposed to enemy fire. Suppressive fire and smoke together minimize the intensity and accuracy of enemy fire. The breaching fundamentals SOSR (Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce) will assist us here. Smoke grenades draw fire; at a minimum, we can expect the enemy to shoot blindly into the smoke cloud. Speed of movement and breaching minimize exposure times. Assault teams must move fast and stay dispersed. If possible, do not stack outside the entry point. Get inside as quickly as possible. (See Figure 6 on page 12.)



Figure 5. 1st Platoon protects the Avenue of Approach to Building 11.



Figure 6. 1st Platoon clears Building 11.

Clearing methodically: Once we have seized a foothold in our building, the tactical problem for the defender changes. If the enemy has low morale or is willing to trade space for time, he may elect to withdraw and take up the fight again on the other side of the next street or suitable clear field of fire. If the enemy regards the building as key terrain and is willing to fight for it, the fight doesn't end until the enemy is destroyed in the building. The defenders inside will shift their attention away from our SBF across the street and toward our assault force as it clears from room to room. On the other hand, defenders of adjacent buildings now know where our entry point is, if they can see it. Follow-on assault teams "run the gauntlet" to reinforce the foothold. There must be a plan for how follow-on teams will enter the building, and a senior leader within the platoon should play "traffic cop" to maintain intervals and dispersion. Fires from SBF positions should shift off the building, but still must focus on identifying and suppressing the enemy and protecting friendly reinforcements. Elements isolating the objective have a difficult task as well, and must be prepared for brief sightings of fleeting targets as the enemy makes his escape. Some shooters should stay oriented on the building until it is completely secured. While many platoons have SOPs that require them to mark every window and door, in reality, this never happens. Room-clearing teams, in the heat of battle, have other things to do. Marking cleared floors and cleared buildings is a must, but we should not have an unrealistic expectation of what our clearing teams will accomplish. (See Figure 7 on page 14.)

Moving in MOUT. Many units have proven adept at clearing rooms using the "stack" technique. Correctly employed, stacks allow us to dominate the room with overwhelming firepower in minimum time. While room-clearing techniques are outside the scope of this article, one by-product of this is that leaders like to stack outside on the friendly side of buildings. Therefore, they can better control their soldiers. The thought process seems to be that reduced dispersion is acceptable, because all distances are compressed in MOUT. There is a fine line between stacking and bunching up. It is not uncommon at JRTC to see five to 10 soldiers stacked behind every friendly-held building where perfectly good cover and concealment are available on the other side of the very wall on which they are leaning. This makes soldiers extremely vulnerable to snipers and airbursts from 82-mm mortar fires. Platoon and company command posts, reserve squads, and casualty collection points are some of the biggest offenders. Be aware that good forward observers are aware of this trend, and will act accordingly. In the terrain of urban combat, buildings offer cover and concealment from enemy fire and observation. They are the best avenue of approach through a city. Stacking outside buildings and moving around exterior walls are techniques that offer speed, but when considering obstacles in our movement, we put soldiers at risk. Remember, if you're not doing anything, don't do it outdoors! (See Figure 8 on page 15.)

One technique that can have a great impact on our ability to defeat the enemy in MOUT is second-story entry techniques, or fighting "top down." One of the best examples of this was on 20 September 1944, in Nijmegen, Holland. The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, fighting to seize the southern edge of a critical bridge across the Waal river, was faced with dug-in, resolute SS troops, determined to contest every room and building in the Hutier Park area and bridge approaches. Many of the multi-story buildings were adjoining, paralleling the streets leading to the bridge. As a result, the paratroopers were able to fight along the rooftops, entering through the uppermost floors and fighting downward to methodically clear the buildings in succession.

Movement Between Buildings-- “A Way”

- Identify entry point on building.
- Select avenue of approach from assault position to entry point.
- Locate portions of avenue of approach that cross open areas and streets.
- Identify buildings that offer clear lines of sight and good fields of fire onto open areas.
- Assign sectors of fire against suspected enemy buildings.
- Breach wall with standoff munitions if available (LAW, AT4, M1).
- Emplace smoke, fire suppressive fires at OBJ, known and suspected buildings.
- Assault squad conducts assault breach if required, secures foothold.
- Leader serves as “traffic cop;” follow-on elements reinforce foothold.

Figure 7



Figure 8: Use of Buildings as Obstacles vs Avenues of Approach.

North Vietnamese Army (NVA) defenders in Hue, South Vietnam, used different techniques when the 5th Marine Regiment fought to take back the city in February 1968. In the Citadel, an ancient, enclosed fortification, the NVA sought to inflict maximum U.S. casualties, but realized that they would eventually be forced to withdraw. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, attacked to the south, crossing a series of east-west running residential streets, labeled, in turn, Phase Line Green, Brown. The NVA established primary and alternate defensive lines on the south side of these streets. The Marines had to resort to overwhelming firepower to achieve a foothold on the enemy-held side of these engagement areas. These footholds invariably started on the ground floors. Once a foothold was established, however, the NVA refused to fight room by room, and quickly withdrew to set up a new defensive line one block to the south. In this case, trading space to set up a new engagement area was more important to the NVA than losing soldiers to prolong the defense of a particular room or building. Marines from the nearby 2nd battalion reported a similar situation. In an assault on the Treasury Building, it took several days to cross the street and establish a foothold, but once across, resistance quickly collapsed and the defenders withdrew to alternate positions.

The company commander of F Company, 2/5 Marines, BG Michael Downs, remarked,

> "For a building that *took so much to get into* (italics supplied), as soon as we were in it, they wanted no part of us. They were on the way out…to say that there were extensive, drawn-out room-to-room defenses would be untrue."

LTG Ernest Cheatham, the 2/5 battalion commander, cautioned that "If we would have thrown a grappling hook…the guy that threw it and the first two guys that got near the rope would have been dead within 10 seconds."

What lessons can we learn from these battles?

Clearing "top down" is an effective way to secure a building. Its chief advantage is that it keeps the attacker from being bottlenecked fighting up a stairwell. It forces the enemy down to the ground floor and out into the open rather than trapping him in an upper floor where there is no alternative but to make a last stand. The chief drawback to second story clearing techniques is time consumption. It increases the vulnerability of soldiers in the open if buildings do not adjoin and the soldiers are forced to use ladders or grapnels. Speed in getting inside a building may take precedence over entry onto an upper-level floor. If the enemy has the ability to observe our entry point, obviously, assault teams will become extremely vulnerable. To clear "top down" requires detailed coordination. We must be able to secure the entry point from enemy fire. As related before, if we are attempting to fight top down and drive the enemy out into the street, we should take the time to cover enemy withdrawal routes with fire to prevent the enemy from escaping to set up a new defense.

An important consideration is the enemy mindset: if we enter the building, will the enemy stand and fight to the death, or break contact and withdraw? If the enemy will break contact anyway, the risk involved outside in scaling the building may offset the potential gains. An irregular or guerrilla force in urban fighting may not behave like a regular army unit defending a piece of key terrain. In MILES on MILES training, fighting to the last man in the last room is commonplace. It will almost assuredly be less likely against a real foe, especially in larger cities which use dozens of alternate defensive lines. In our defensive training, we practice moving to alternate and supplementary positions if the primary positions become untenable. We should not assume that the enemy will act like an E-type silhouette at the local tire house and passively accept destruction at the hands of our clearing teams. He will probably not defend somebody else's living room or kitchen to the bitter end if he can run out the back and put some open ground in front of him.

Another consideration is the building makeup itself. In Nijmegen in 1944, downtown buildings were so close together, U.S. paratroopers could leap from rooftop to rooftop. As related before, if we are attempting to fight top down and drive the enemy out into the street, we should take the time to cover enemy withdrawal routes with fire to prevent them from escaping to set up a new defense. There are advantages and disadvantages to both methods; whether to seek a foothold at ground level or not is a decision best made by the man in the area based on the circumstances.

Flexibility. At JRTC, it is common to see platoon leaders receive a mission to secure a particular building as part of the company mission. They spend the majority of their work time planning a set-piece, deliberate attack identifying SBF positions, breach points, and task-organizing appropriately. On the objective, one of two events *almost always happens:*

1) A friendly unit has been rendered combat ineffective and failed to secure its objective; as a result, the platoon must conduct a hasty attack to secure one or more buildings en route to their objective.
2) The platoon secures its objective, but because of friendly casualties elsewhere, is given a follow-on mission to continue the attack.

Usually these additional missions were not anticipated and come as a surprise. On the objective, common problems include hasty reconnaissance and a failure to read the urban terrain. These hasty plans frequently result in "tunnel vision." Fires are oriented almost exclusively on the building to be assaulted. Rifle platoons, as a result, are more likely to become disoriented and become increasingly vulnerable to fires from unexpected directions.

Building flexibility into the plan. Regardless of the objective building assigned, leaders should conduct contingency planning to include a hasty attack on a building different from the objective assigned. Rehearsals should include assigning sectors of fire, use of suppression and obscuration to protect the avenue of approach to the objective, designation of entry points, breaching techniques, and marking. Battalion scouts will not be able to identify every obstacle, and the platoon should always be prepared to conduct an in-stride or assault breach. When possible, contingency tasks for the squads should mirror the tasks assigned for the original objective. This minimizes confusion. Note Figure 9 on page 18. In this case, squads are assigned sectors of fire and tasks for the assault that generally mirror the plan for the original assault on Building 11. This is not intended to create a "cookie cutter" effect, but by assigning sectors beforehand, we maximize security. Whenever possible, refine the plan based on the enemy situation, the "terrain" of nearby buildings, and reports of what buildings are known to be occupied by friendly and enemy troops.

Situational Awareness. The enemy will not advertise his presence; only after making contact will we get a true picture of his disposition and intent. Because of the close engagement distances common in MOUT, hidden enemy can inflict severe losses in a short period of time. If leaders are not aware of what is happening around them, the attack is liable to be overcome by events. A frequent situation is for a platoon or company to be given a "follow-on" mission to pass through a unit in contact and continue the attack to an intermediate or final objective. The follow-on unit is briefed on what buildings will be secured as part of condition-setting for their attack. The enemy, unfortunately, doesn't follow the plan. If the conditions are not set, and the follow-on unit is not aware of what is happening, fire is received from buildings on which SBF elements are not oriented. The results are grim.



Figure 9. 1st Platoon Contingency Planning -- Hasty Attack.

Let's look at Figure 10 on page 20. The company commander has directed 1st and 2d platoons to attack in sector. To provide control, he has designated two phase lines, Red and White. Neither platoon is allowed to cross its phase line without permission. Third platoon will follow 1st, and on order, assume main effort and seize the company objective, building 13, OBJ ROCK. The company commander sees the order of attack as buildings 11-22-12-13-23.

Unfortunately the plan goes awry. 1st Platoon is engaged by a reinforced squad in building 11, and a squad with a machine gun firing from building 23. Casualties mount, and 1st platoon is rendered combat ineffective. Building 22, on the other hand, appears to be lightly held. 2d platoon is directed to secure 22, and suppress the enemy in 23 and 11. 3d Platoon is directed to renew the assault on 11 after 2d attacks.

Comments:

1) The use of phase lines in this example represents a way to keep one platoon from out-distancing the other. It is difficult to advance down one side of the street without securing both. In this example, two platoons bounding side by side provide security to each other's flanks. Notice also that moving with the grain, parallel to the street from building to building, is safer than crossing the street, or moving against the grain.

2) In this case, the 2d platoon leader has a decision to make. In his original plan, he did not make allowances for having to suppress the enemy in 11, because that building should have been cleared by 1st platoon before he jumped off. If 2d platoon does not reorient at least some of their fires onto the east side of 11, the result could be disastrous. It may require 3d and 2d platoon together to gain the fire superiority necessary to advance onto 22, or 3d may have to attack 11 for a second time. Regardless, if 2d platoon is not maintaining good communication and situational awareness, they will be in deep trouble if the enemy in building 11 reorient to the east. Building 22 may not require as much suppression as 11, even though 22 is the objective of the platoon attack. *It is not uncommon to see one failed platoon attack adversely affect several other platoons nearby, especially if all concerned continue blindly along the original path.*

3) The 3d platoon leader has decisions to make as well. Building 13 does not resemble 11 or 12. 3d platoon takes up firing positions in the rooms on the north side of building 10, while the PL tries to find someone in 1st to update him on the situation. It's going to take some time to come up with a new plan; by the time 3d secures building 12, they are at 50-percent strength and must re-task-organize as the original assault squad has taken heavy casualties.

Conclusions: MOUT is a complex operation. Effective combat units are able to identify the high payoff tasks required to accomplish their mission, establish solid SOPs, and train to standard. Movement between buildings is where the majority of casualties occur in the village of Shughart-Gordon. This problem is a direct result of a lack of understanding of the nature of MOUT and lack of training emphasis on the specific collective tasks required. Units that emphasize movement between buildings and achieve a level of proficiency at this task will be attacking the source of the single greatest cause of casualties in MOUT. To do so requires us to understand how the enemy fights, focus on the relationship between fire and movement in cities, and the requirement to maintain continuous security as well as a sense of tempo and tactical patience. If we are successful here, we will be able to minimize casualties and set up our squads for success as they close with the enemy. We will then be well on our way to accomplishing the mission.✪



Figure 10. Situational Awareness

Fighting as the Combat Security Outpost

by SSG Joseph Delatorre, Scout Section Leader, 3d MRB, CMTC, OPFOR

Team Alpha's lead platoon has just identified a conventional obstacle blocking a key chokepoint on the company's route. The lead platoon reports negative contact and requests that the attached engineer platoon come forward to conduct a breach. As the engineers move forward, the OPFOR calls for fire on the breach site. As the artillery begins to impact, three well-positioned BMPs engage and destroy the engineers. In the confusion of integrated fires, the BMPs reposition without sustaining major damage.

The result of this engagement is significant. Team Alpha is unable to breach the obstacle in time to allow the Task Force (TF) to conduct a coordinated attack on the objective. Three BMPs have successfully completed their task to destroy task force breaching assets, thereby separating the maneuver companies of the task force and allowing the OPFOR commander to fight the Task Force one company at a time.

Every unit that has participated in high intensity conflict (HIC) rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) has conducted an attack against a tough, well-trained, world-class opposing force (OPFOR). Most have experienced, at least once, the frustration of having their plan of attack foiled by a small but lethal enemy element called the *Combat Security Outpost (CSOP).*

CONCEPT

The overall concept of the CSOP is actually quite simple. It is a small force with a good game plan to execute its mission. The game plan is driven by *task* and *purpose.*

Task organization: Typically, two to three BMPs, with three-man teams. Based on the threat, it is usually reinforced with one to three dismounted infantry squads. Dismounted teams can be employed as forward observers or to execute antiarmor ambushes.

Task: To destroy TF key assets (*i.e.*, engineers, command and control elements, reconnaissance assets, combat vehicles).

Purpose: To disrupt the TF attack. Specific purpose varies from mission to mission. The purpose may be to prevent the envelopment of the main effort battle position; isolate company/team(s), allowing the OPFOR commander to fight one company/team at a time, or to prevent TF reconnaissance from gathering information.

PREPARATION PHASE

Since the CSOP fights as an independent element, SOPs are rigidly enforced to ensure that once contact is made, any one element can continue the mission.



Techniques:

● **Ensure that all leaders know the obstacles and targets in their area of responsibility.**

● **Rehearse the "fall out one drill." Ensure that people know who is in charge and what the commander's intent is.**

● **Rehearse insertion and extraction of dismounted teams.**

● **Plan for artillery targets at all obstacles and chokepoints, and confirm with a Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR).**

● **Stockpile class IV material to re-seed any pre-breaches.**

● **Build false vehicle positions to deceive the TF scouts as to where the CSOP is located.**

COUNTER-RECONNAISANCE FIGHT

During the counter-reconnaissance fight, the overall focus of the CSOP is to prevent the TF scouts from penetrating the security zone of the defense. This is done through aggressive patrolling by dismounted teams to locate and destroy the TF scouts. The BMPs are especially vulnerable during this phase and must continue to minimize their movement to avoid detection. The intent is to defeat the TF intelligence-gathering assets without the loss of CSOP combat power.

Techniques:

● **Maintain rigid noise and light discipline.**

● **Move the vehicle every time it starts (at least 400m).**

● **Place infantry squads along likely dismounted avenues of approach.**

● **Use early warning devices and protective wire on dismounted avenues of approach.**

● **Minimize the use of BMPs to fight TF dismounted teams. If dismounted teams are in contact, support them with artillery. If feasible, pull them out and reinsert them later.**

● **Provide accurate and timely reports (SALT).**

MAIN BATTLE ENGAGEMENT

As the Task Force enters the security zone, the main emphasis is to figure out where the Company Teams are and of what they consist. The remaining dismounted squads prepare to conduct antiarmor ambushes overwatching key chokepoints or obstacles with the instructions to only engage engineers. Once the company/team hits an obstacle, artillery is summoned. The CSOP can destroy, in some cases, an entire company/team or cause it to become isolated from the Task Force.

Techniques:

● **Rapidly report on enemy activity. Maintain contact (passive or active).**

● **Direct fire to the flank or rear of combat vehicles.**

● **Do not become decisively engaged.**

● **Initiate direct fires after artillery begins impacting on target. This helps to keep the BMPs from being detected.**

● **Protect obstacles.**

● **Inflict as many casualties as possible without undue risk to the CSOP.**

● **A company/team that cannot breach an obstacle will spend more time trying to find another way to its objective, or have to wait for assets to be sent forward.**

● **If it sits still, call for artillery (if available).**

WEAKNESSESS

The CSOP is most destructive when the Task Force closes on the OPFOR obstacle belt. Therefore, the early identification and destruction of the CSOP will greatly enhance the Task Force's chances for success. TF scouts that identify the CSOP should attempt to refine locations to add them to the preparatory fire plan of the TF.

● **The Task Force has more reconnaissance assets now with the BRT. Use the TF scouts to locate the CSOP.**

● **As the TF closes on the obstacle belt, use infantry to clear and secure chokepoints for the company teams.**

● **Protect your breach assets.**

● **Rehearse breach drills (apply SOSR).**

● **Limited combat power.**

SUMMARY

A unit that does not address the threat of the CSOP is opening up the possibility of defeat. The Combat Security Outpost, through planning, rehearsal and execution, can ensure that the defending Motorized Rifle Company can defeat a much larger and better-equipped force. Maximum confusion caused by integrated direct and indirect fires is the key to CSOP success. Hopefully, some of the tips or techniques outline above will help units prepare not just for rotations here at CMTC, but for possible future conflicts as well.✪

SUSTAINING THE OPERATIONAL MOMENTUM

by MAJ Jay Peterson, O/C, JRTC

At 1800 D-2, a battalion inserts scout reconnaissance squads into Cortina to check the suitability of the designated landing zones (LZs) that follow-on forces will use during the D-Day insertion. The reconnaissance squads would also evaluate the enemy situation and report. It was decided during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) that the focus for the battalion's follow-on missions would be based on the success of the scout insertion and the follow-on air assault.

At 0200 D-Day, CPT Jones, A Company commander, reports to battalion that his 3d platoon linked-up with the company, completing the brigade air assault. Because of heavy enemy indirect fires, the battalion commander orders CPT Jones to move to the vicinity of a possible enemy 81mm mortar that was identified by OH-58 aircraft. Jones asks the battalion if there are any friendly units near that location that could assist in locating the enemy position. He is told that currently all units are in the vicinity of the LZs and that the scout platoon will be pushed into zone the following morning after they conduct link-up and resupply through the battalion tactical command post (TAC). A little hesitant to go out in the blind, CPT Jones gives a final update to the platoon leaders and issues the order to begin the movement to contact to destroy the Cortina Liberation Force (CLF) in zone. CPT Jones feels confident he can succeed. His platoons are green on personnel, ammunition and water, and the 60mm mortar section is available but shooting hand-held only (baseplates expected in on the ground convoy). Because of the fact that the air assault includes multiple LZs, the battalion has attached an advance trauma life support (ATLS) team to his company to quickly treat any wounded.

As the sun begins to peak over the horizon, 3d platoon is greeted with a fury of gunfire; the platoon executes the proper battle drills quickly and finishes off the enemy, but in doing so sustains 14 casualties. The platoon medic immediately goes to work treating the wounded; the walking wounded are treated, and then under a security effort, escorted back 2 kilometers to the ATLS team. Litter casualties are consolidated and moved to the company collection point to await evacuation but the battalion's front-line ambulances (FLAs) are not due in until 1100 with the ground assault convoys. Furthermore, the ATLS team has no transportation to move forward to assist in stabilizing the wounded. Because of limited aircraft, air evacuation will not be available until the forward area arming and refueling point (FAARP) can get established with the brigade support area (BSA). The enemy has had time because of these delays to identify the platoon-size formation and begins to disrupt the evacuation process.

By 1000 CPT Jones has one combat-ineffective platoon due to casualties with his other platoons fighting through the enemy to get to the 3d platoon to secure the casualties. Since the company outdistanced its 60mm mortars, the battalion mortars are now low on HE rounds. Additionally, with no ground lines of communication (LOC) cleared, two anti-tank (AT) vehicles sit, destroyed, in a minefield, while attempting to provide support to the 3d platoon. CPT Jones ponders quickly, "What did I do wrong?" Unfortunately, back at the battalion tactical operations center (TOC), the commander, XO, and S-3 are thinking the same thing.

What Happened?

- **The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) did not go beyond the initial insertion.**
  - ☞ **Reconnaissance efforts primarily focused at the LZs.**
  - ☞ **Lack of prediction on the enemy reaction to the insertion, and no eyes forward to confirm or deny any prediction.**
- **Maneuver plan desynchronized due to lack of intelligence.**
  - ☞ **Quick movement of unit prevented reconnaissance; however, the company commander could have certainly done this with his organic assets.**
  - ☞ **60mm mortars not prepared to support with fires.**
  - ☞ **Lack of a combined arms plan, i.e., availability of attack aviation, coordinated fires plan or use of mechanized or motorized infantry.**
- **Logistics plan not prepared to support the plan.**
  - ☞ **Ground or Air LOCs.**
  - ☞ **Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) plan.**

This article discusses the relationship of logistics and support operations to the maneuver plan, which is based on intelligence, particularly in the area where units conducting operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) are not adequately allowing the build-up of combat power in the initial **Operational** operation. This article assists units in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that allow time for the identification of the enemy forces, initial combat operations, and the sustainment of those initial forces and the introduction of follow-on assets.

SUSTAINING THE MOMENTUM



Figure 1. Operational Logistical Momentum Comparison

The illustration on page 25 attempts to explain how both operational and logistical momentum must be linked for continuous operations to actually continue. By using this methodology, the battalion staff would apply time to the operation for events to occur in a prepared manner. Typically, as soon as units hit the ground in Cortina the hunt for the enemy begins. By not expanding the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) to develop information for the next phase of the operation, enemy activity cannot be confirmed, or denied, and units move out blind. Having small elements out conducting the R&S provides flexibility to the commander. First, less personnel prevents a strain on what may be limited CASEVAC and resupply assets available early in a mission. Second, by keeping the maneuver close initially allows the area from which the unit will expand to be cleared of the enemy and prevent the loss of critical high-value targets (HVTs) (command and control (C^2) nodes, mortars, and the limited resupply already mentioned). Thus, this force sustains itself until it is fully prepared to go after the enemy in a larger zone. While the R&S plan is being executed, the unit can also focus on the build-up of combat power, i.e., logistics trains moving into the zone of operations.

Looking at the opening scenario and comparing it to Figure 1, what occurred is the maneuver going from the R&S plan straight to maneuver, not allowing the R&S to be executed, and thus causing the logistics chain to accelerate. This can prove difficult if no prior planning is conducted and the key elements to support the maneuver are not in the position to support.



Figure 2. Execution of the R&S of the Build-up of Combat Power

As information arrives through the intelligence chain, the battalion can task-organize for future operations. This task organization, not only within the maneuver forces, but also the supporting elements for the intelligence gatherers (Figure 2 depicts only scout elements), can include other intelligence sources such as unmanned aerial



vehicle (UAV), low-level voice intercept (LLVI), or remotely monitored battlefield sensor system (REMBASS). Supervised by the XO, the S-1, S-4, and medical platoon leader can develop the support plan for maneuver forces. While the commander develops the maneuver plan with the S-3, FSO and S-2 determining task organization and missions for units for targeted areas, the XO can supervise the parallel support plan. From continuous, updated staff estimates, task-organizing support elements can include:

- ***Casualty Estimate.***
  - ☞ **Where are casualties most likely, can the battalion push internal CASEVAC assets forward safely?**
  - ☞ **Where can ambulance exchange points (AXPs) be established in close proximity to assist in moving casualties immediately to a higher level of care?**
  - ☞ **Identification of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) LZs in the zone of operation.**
- ***Logistics Estimate.***
  - ☞ **What do the maneuver forces need prior to execution of follow-on operations?**
  - ☞ **To where, when and how will essential supplies (food, water, fuel, ammunition and batteries) be pushed?**
  - ☞ **What ground LOCs are available?**
  - ☞ **Availability of aerial resupply.**
- ***Use of Available Assets.***
  - ☞ **Use of trucks for unit movement rather than foot march.**
  - ☞ **Means of extraction of intelligence gatherers.**

Now the maneuver forces are prepared to conduct offensive operations outside the initial entry point (i.e., airhead line); they have both the equipment and assets to support their operations. As contact is made with the enemy, XOs, both at battalion and company levels, must supervise the location of the supporting assets to maintain the operational momentum. Ensuring the ammunition is pushed to the right place and time needed or requested by the maneuver forces can mean success over the enemy. This ammunition resupply applies throughout the battlefield and not just to the units in contact. Failing to maintain a ready supply of ammunition for the 81mm mortars or fuel to the AT platoon held as a reserve can prevent the commander from using the overwhelming combat power he has available to destroy the enemy.

When contact with the enemy is broken, the support plan to evacuate casualties, resupply and units must be known and understood by the maneuver commanders to prevent casualties from being left on the battlefield and their units in need of critical supplies. This will preclude the unit being held at one location too long, securing casualties, ultimately allowing them to maintain contact with the enemy. Additionally, if not done in a timely manner, this will degrade the S-2's ability to gain information on the enemy from those involved in the contact.

While intelligence drives maneuver, ensuring that logistics are linked in detail to the operational momentum, a battalion can gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Units will know they have what is necessary to carry out their operations and that casualties are taken care of quickly. This synchronized effort will keep the battle rhythm continuous within the commander's intent. In addition, the effort enables the MDMP in continuous operations to flow into the next expected fight and keep the battalion focused on the enemy.



What must units do at home station to prepare for combat operations?

● **Train the execution of the R&S plan – time must be allotted to assets such as the scout platoon, in continuous operations, to plan, prepare, and move into zone or sector to build the intelligence plan for the battalion.** This should include company commanders conducting link-up with scouts, either FM or in person, to have real-time knowledge of the area they are about to enter.

● **Move the TOC, administrative/logistics operations center (ALOC) and trains to the field.** Understandably the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of today's Army is fast and furious, but by allowing these staff agencies to train on sustaining the force from the field, the development of planning guidance and detailed logistics standing operating procedures (SOPs) can be known and understood.

● **Staff exercises (STAFFEXs) will allow the different agencies within the TOC and ALOC to predict timings between the maneuver and logistics personnel.**

● **Thoroughly wargame logistics during the MDMP. CSS takes a back seat in the synchronization process far too often – usually resulting in slow reaction drills because of the number of agencies that are involved to maintain logistical and personnel issues.**

● **Add a logistical backbrief to operations orders.** Just as company commanders provide the commander with their plan, the battalion XO (HHC Cdr, medical officer, S-1/S-4, and Spt Plt Ldr) can describe their plan to support combat operations. Four of the six mentioned are typically lieutenants. The backbrief also serves as professional development at the same time.

● **Tie routine reports to company training.** Make the company commander fully aware of what a late personnel status (PERSTAT) or logistical status (LOGSTAT) will do to his operation. These reports will gain his attention quickly. Furthermore, if not already incorporated into the LOGSTAT, add an area where the company commanders can predict what they will need in the future (24 - 48 hours).✪

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ANNEX:
What Do You Want the Public to Know?

by CPT Scott C. Stearns, Chief of Field Production, NTC

Instant communication changed the way the media will report future wars. Digital video and satellite telephones give national media representatives the ability to report live from the battlefield. This fact is forcing commanders to develop a deliberate plan on how their units facilitate media in their area of responsibility. The media plan, a well-written public affairs annex, should appear in the Operations Plans (OPLAN) or Operations Orders (OPORD) as Annex V.

Current public affairs doctrine assigns a public affairs officer (PAO), in the rank of Major/Lieutenant Colonel, to each divisional staff. These PAOs must aggressively develop information strategies while simultaneously representing the division as the command spokesman. Deliberate public affairs planning requires the division PAO to develop an Annex V to the Division OPLAN/ OPORD. Annex V must reflect the division commander's guidance and it must adhere to Department of Defense Principles of Information. A well-written annex covers all conceivable contingencies while guiding subordinate brigades through their public affairs tasks. Unfortunately, brigades are not assigned permanent PAOs or staffs, so the development of information strategies and the deliberate public affairs planning, at best, is curtailed, and, at worst, tends to stop.

FM 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations,* states that "the brigade public affairs section provides public affairs support to combat or separate brigades, or brigade-level task forces deployed in support of combined or joint operations." Brigade public affairs sections will probably be a division PAO attachment consisting of a couple of enlisted print journalists.

A "fully funded" brigade public affairs section, a Public Affairs Detachment (PAD), includes a captain, an NCOIC, two broadcasters, and three print journalists. PAD commanders are trained PAOs, but with only 11 PADs in the Active Army, a deployment of any size or duration will quickly exhaust the available supply. End state is that many deployed brigades, especially those coming to the NTC, do so without trained public affairs personnel.

Most brigade combat teams solve the problem at the NTC by assigning public affairs duties to a junior officer or senior noncommissioned officer from the brigade staff. This option works, but since it's not their primary duty, deliberate public affairs planning suffers. A solution to this challenge is to restrict brigade public affairs focus to a few, extremely important areas. Don't ignore MDMP, but in time-sensitive situations, an abbreviated decision-making process should be employed. Keeping the focus on deliberate planning that is restricted to a limited number of areas allows brigade public affairs representatives to produce an Annex V to the brigade OPLAN/OPORD that provides the required critical guidance needed by subordinate commanders.



Public affairs annexes are written in the standard five-paragraph operations order format of: **situation, mission, execution, service support, and command and signal.** Depending on the operation, the annex may also have numerous appendices containing specific guidance. The **first paragraph, situation,** addresses the standard areas of enemy forces, friendly forces, attachments, detachments, and assumptions. Enemy forces are normally addressed in Annex B, Intelligence. The subparagraphs on friendly forces, attachments, and detachments should focus on public affairs elements. The assumptions subparagraph reflects your media content analysis. Areas of primary focus are:

a. The information conditions within the area of operations.
b. Media activity, both U.S. and foreign, within the area of responsibility.
c. Host-nation ability to control or otherwise effect media relations.
d. Prediction of future U.S. and foreign reporting.

The **second paragraph, mission,** is a clear, concise statement addressing the who, what, where, when, and why of the public affairs element. The **third paragraph, execution,** contains a large amount of important information, but the areas of critical concern are: the concept of the operation, coordinating instructions, and the additional paragraphs (if needed). The primary areas covered in the concept are:

a. Phases of the Operation -- pre-deployment, deployment, operation, and re-deployment.
b. Priority of Effort -- internal or command information.
c. Audience -- internal (unit) or external (public).
d. Command Messages – focused on the mission and/or unit personnel.

The elements of the concept change with each phase of the operation. An example is:

During the ***Deployment Phase –***

The priority of effort: Internal information.

The primary audience: Internal - junior officer/enlisted, family members.

The command message: This unit is superbly trained, well led, and prepared to accomplish this mission. We will also focus on taking care of the family members left behind.

Coordinating instructions are tasks that apply to two or more subordinate elements. Brigade PADs should develop coordinating instructions that assist the unit's media facilitation. Coordinating instructions will vary from mission to mission, but some examples are:

a. Daily reporting requirements.
b. Release authority for certain types of information (attempt to delegate this requirement to the lowest level possible).
c. Media contact reporting procedures.
d. Media registration standards.
e. Specific events effecting more then one task force.

Additional paragraphs to the execution paragraph may be needed to help subordinate units complete the public affairs mission. Examples of possible additional paragraphs are:

a. Mission-specific OPSEC considerations.
b. Media access procedures and limitations.
c. Military escort requirements.
d. Specific internal or command information.
e. Media pool considerations and requirements.
f. Embedded media plan.
g. Anticipated questions with suggested answers (generic).
h. DA-approved messages.
i. Public affairs guidance.
j. Execution matrix.

The **fourth paragraph, service support,** becomes critical if the brigade is required to provide logistical support to the media. This logistical support should only be required for embedded media. Embedded media logistical considerations should be part of the coordinating instructions. Further guidance should be included in the appendices if the embedded media are a substantial part of the public affairs mission.

The **fifth paragraph, command and signal,** may need emphasis in the area of communications. National media representatives, especially embedded media, may need access to word processors, telephones and fax machines. Brigades must plan to assist the media representatives. The U.S. Army allows the media to use Army equipment to file their stories, but brigades rarely have the assets to support this type of operation. Helping the media representatives, when possible, can only improve your military-media relationship.

Appendices to brigade's Annex V should contain guidance to cover possible contingencies. Annex V, 52 ID Operations Order, as used at the NTC, contains seven appendices, ranging from media relations guidance to media clearance requests. These appendices were developed in response to situations units have faced in "Mojavia."

Success at the NTC, and in other parts of the real world, require the brigade to demonstrate strong planning skills and deliver a high quality Annex V to their operations order. Commanders who understand the areas outlined above have the best chance of success.✪

MOUT and the U.S. Army: *Give Us Time to Train*

by MAJ Brett C. Jenkinson, CMTC MOUT OIC

In this article I will dispel any doubts you have about the Army's Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) fighting abilities and will offer an interim fix for the Army's perceived MOUT shortcomings. I will analyze the changes in MOUT training conditions over the past 10 years and outline the steps the Combat Maneuver Training Center is taking to improve the MOUT fighting abilities within U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR).

The bottom line from an officer who has been at the Infantry Battalion and below for the past 10 years: ***The sky is not falling on the Army's MOUT fighting abilities!***

- **MOUT skills in the U.S. Army are better now than they have ever been.**
- **Technological development is not the interim fix to any perceived shortcomings.**
- **The fixes to any MOUT shortcomings lie in continued training and refinement of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).**

Scores of studies, conferences, and other initiatives have brought MOUT fighting directly to the front of the Army's key leaders and the nation's political leadership. There is no dispute that, given current trends toward peace support operations and the global political situation, deployment into an urban combat scenario is inevitable and the Army must focus some of its training in a MOUT environment. The 75th Ranger Regiment anticipated "…our most probable combat situation -- physically grueling, lethal operations encountered in a night, MOUT environment" (75th Ranger Regiment's FY99 training guidance). However, the prevailing concern for lacking MOUT skills is not wholly founded.

TRAINING CONDITIONS

In the early 1990s, the Army conducted MOUT training in an unconstrained environment. Collateral damage and treatment of noncombatants were not considered at all. Infantry battalions did not execute target discrimination in the close fight. Use of indiscriminate indirect fires and close air support were commonplace in MOUT training. In the close fight, the first object to enter any uncleared room was always a fragmentary hand grenade, followed immediately by two soldiers firing indiscriminately. Anyone in the way was a casualty. This technique is now used only in high-intensity conflicts but used to be considered the "cost of doing business" in any MOUT environment.

From World War II until the early 1990s, the MOUT training skills at the tactical level in the conventional MOUT arena had changed little. However, today's rules of engagement (ROE) and other constraints do not permit such collateral damage and noncombatant casualties. Since 1995, the Army is expected to conduct precision MOUT. The unfortunate by-product of these increased constraints has been higher (simulated) casualties in training and the appearance of lower overall readiness to fight in built-up areas. This probably raised the eyebrows of the Army's senior leadership and left them wondering what had happened.

Several things happened. Shortly after losing 18 Rangers in Somalia, outsiders falsely concluded that this tragedy resulted from the Army's loss of its urban fighting skills. On the contrary, if any battalion-sized unit in the Army could have made the mission in Somalia successful, it was a battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment. The 3d Battalion, 75th Rangers were as well trained as any unit in the Army could be. Unlike conventional U.S. Army units, the Rangers are not hindered by the Training, Mission, and Support cycle. The Rangers train. The Rangers execute. They do both extremely well. Their lethality in battle is awe-inspiring.



Since their organization under the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Rangers have attended the Special Operations Training (SOT) Course, a course that trains Close Quarters Combat (CQC) techniques. SOT, offered only to USASOC units and staffed by the best of the best in close quarters fighting, teaches the latest short-range shooting skills, breaching and barrier penetration techniques, and room-clearing techniques.

The Ranger Regiment has, consequently, incorporated techniques from SOT in their standing operating procedures (SOPs). Rangers who attend this course are the subject matter experts and trainers for CQC skills in the Ranger Regiment.

The training methodology used in SOT was also incorporated into the Ranger Training Circular 350-1-2. As Rangers rotated into conventional Army units and shared their lessons learned, these special operations techniques began to appear in conventional Army units' close quarters battle SOPs.

To fill the void in MOUT doctrinal guidance after Somalia, some of the close quarters combat techniques, already used by special operations units, were included in the Army's Change No. 1, 3 October 1995, to **FM 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas.*** These techniques were not new to the special operations community. They *were* new to the conventional Army and immediately became the new standard for the conventional Army.

These techniques, specifically the use of the four-man stack during room, hallway, and stairwell clearing, were originally used only in special operations units. Because special operations soldiers are specially selected, they are inherently more highly skilled and experienced upon recruitment. They possess a greater ability to assimilate difficult fighting skills more quickly and easily than their conventional counterparts. Moreover, because of the training cycle of special operations units, they have the time and assets to create highly trained, hyper-performance soldiers, leaders, and units.

Conventional units, on the other hand, have limited time and resources to train and rehearse close quarters battle skills. Mastery of these techniques demands perhaps one hundred times the hours, ammunition, and facilities that the conventional Army can resource. On top of this, many Infantry battalions do not even have Change No. 1 to FM 90-10-1 in their unit libraries. So, expecting conventional units to conduct precision MOUT equally as well as the special operations units has resulted in an unrealistic standard. Because conventional units are playing catchup, interim assessments of conventional units' performance leads to the conclusion that the level of performance has apparently dropped. This is not so.

Conventional units are better than they ever have been, despite being well off the mark set by special operations units. Additionally, conventional units' ability to validate their skills with live ammunition is all but impossible on most Army installations. To add to the precision MOUT challenge, the average infantry unit now trains in a complex battlefield: one with a mixture of combatants and non-combatants under restrictive ROE.

Increasing battlefield complexity has also raised the bar for the junior enlisted soldiers who have probably not even conducted a squad maneuver live-fire exercise in a high-intensity conflict scenario without non-combatants. We now expect these inexperienced, junior enlisted soldiers to conduct a precisely executed combat task in the most challenging terrain imaginable while limiting collateral damage and without non-combatant casualties.

Today, MOUT is complicated by legal liability of non-combatant casualties, restrictions on weapons and munitions, strict ROE, and thousands of split-second ethical dilemmas -- all in the same incredibly challenging terrain. The Army has not lost its MOUT fighting skills. The Army has dramatically increased its standards. It takes training time, resources, and qualified trainers to meet these higher standards.

THROWING MONEY AT PROBLEMS

To overcome the technological parity in MOUT, the DoD has funded some outstanding technological advancements. A few of the current projects are: see-through wall technology, an infrared friendly/enemy/noncombatant marking system, miniature, remote controlled optics, and position location systems for use inside buildings. These are all great ideas and certainly needed to gain the technological advantage over an enemy who knows he can even the odds by fighting us in built-up areas. However, the probability of fielding these items within the next 10 years is remote, while the probability of fighting in a built-up area, we have decided, is highly likely.

Another leap in technology development is an integrated system worn/carried by individual soldier. It is digitally linked to a higher headquarters command post. The system will allow the command post to see exactly what the soldier sees, in real time. It boasts a position locator and has a heads-up display for the soldier. The display is linked to a night sight for his individual weapon. To the casual observer, all this sounds like a great idea. Soldiers and their commanders will receive more information than they are currently receiving.

Unfortunately, this system has two significant drawbacks: 1) it weighs 46 pounds, and 2) the average soldier cannot process any more information than he is already receiving. Leaders who have not fought in a built-up area and the R&D community may not have an appreciation for the sensory input the soldier in a complex MOUT environment already receives:

- **The enemy threat -- in three dimensions (not just at ground level).**
- **Smoke (becomes oppressive inside buildings).**
- **Increased noise (echoes inside rooms).**
- **Difficult, compartmentalized terrain.**
- **Increased casualties in a confined area.**
- **Target discrimination difficulty between combatants and non-combatants.**

After MOUT training, most soldiers readily admit some involuntary sensory gating which results in a loss of situational awareness. A soldier cannot be further burdened by more sensory input and an additional 46 pounds atop his 100 pounds of body armor, seven 30-round magazines, four hand grenades/flash bangs, smoke grenades, breach kit, demolitions, marking kit, and radio.

We are simply expecting too much of the Infantryman. If one compares what the average Infantryman must have to fight in MOUT with the equipment that Army's special operations units currently use, there is a significant disparity. Of nearly 100 special operations direct action soldiers and leaders personally interviewed regarding what tools were needed for MOUT, none of the above technological advances made the list. They all listed the requirement for a set of basic protective equipment and lots of hands-on training. We cannot expect more from the average Infantryman than we do from the specially selected, most highly trained soldiers in the U.S. Army.

The question remains: Does the Army have adequate equipment to fight and win in the MOUT environment? Yes. Some of the basic protective equipment (knee and elbow pads) may require local purchase, but all the really necessary equipment is already in the Army supply system.

BOTTOM LINE: **MOUT proficiency demands time to train, first and foremost.**

MOUT FIXES AND TTPs

As interest in MOUT increases, the Army continues to sharpen its focus on MOUT. The Army is conducting more MOUT training than ever before. Proficiency is improving exponentially. The Army must be given the time and resources to train MOUT.

The Army is taking several steps in the right direction:

1) Along with revising current training manuals, the Combined Arms MOUT Task Force (CAMTF) has taken the first step by standardizing the overarching MOUT training strategy. CAMTF is moving by leaps and bounds beyond other DoD organizations in this arena. The U.S. Marine Corps has been touted as leading the way in MOUT doctrine and training. Yet, comparison of the Corps' doctrine (MCWP 3-35.3) with that of the Army (FM 90-10-1, w/Change No. 1) reveals no substantial improvement over the Army's current doctrine.

2) In USAREUR, Infantry brigade commanders are designating "MOUT battalions" to be their "go-to" guys in MOUT. They realize that their battalions cannot be experts in all combat tasks. Since MOUT requires so much training time in specific tasks, certain units are specializing in MOUT.

3) The Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), USAREUR's CTC, now offers a MOUT Leader's Course. This program is tailored to fit the unit's available training time and can be one through five days in length. The program is designed to "Train the Trainer" and is the only one of its type in the conventional Army. The program is a stepping stone program which teaches the unit leadership, from fire team leader to the Battalion Commander, everything from individual movement techniques in a built-up area to organizing, planning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing, and executing a battalion-level MOUT mission.

These fixes certainly do not address all the variables in the equation to MOUT success. They are, however, steps in the right direction. Coupled with the above fixes, the Army must continue to improve in the following areas:

1) The Army must provide additional time and money to train MOUT.

2) CMTC and the NTC undoubtedly need instrumented MOUT sites to improve feedback and After-Action Reviews (AARs).

3) More importantly, USAREUR and all CONUS Army installations must develop a live-fire-capable MOUT site to validate units' training and SOPs.

4) While the current FM 90-10-1 w/Change No. 1 is adequate, doctrine writers must address MOUT above the tactical level. There is little written about MOUT planning and execution for Brigade staffs and above.

CONCLUSION

The Army's state of MOUT is not as bad as some would like to believe. The Army has been sold short on its MOUT skills. The shortcomings are mostly a result of setting higher standards, increased restraints, more complex battlefields, misplaced funding efforts, and a lack of adequate training time. The Army can produce "hyper-performance" MOUT units -- if the Army's leadership resists the temptation to believe that technology can correct the near-term performance shortcomings. They must believe that training time is the single most important factor in mastering combat skills in the "most probable combat situation – physically grueling, lethal operation," ***MOUT.***✪

The Battalion/Task Force Fire Support NCO (FSNCO)… and the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

by SFC Edward J. Zackery, Task Force Fire Support Trainer,
Light Force Combat Trainer Division (Airborne), NTC, Fort Irwin, CA

The Problem

Sergeants first class (SFCs) working in a Battalion/Task-Force Fire Support Element (FSE) as the Fire Support Noncommissioned Officer (FSNCO) are not involved in the MDMP during the plan and preparation phase of the operation. As many as 80 percent of the FSNCOs that come to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) lack the experience, training, and knowledge it takes to participate in the planning with a battalion or task force staff. This can be an intimidating situation for even the most experienced FSNCOs, not to mention the newly promoted SFC who has had little or no training on mission analysis or course-of-action comparison.

In this environment, the FSNCO is left out of the planning process and, therefore, seldom understands the integration of fire support with the scheme of maneuver. As one of the key executors in the Battalion/Task-Force fire support plan, he needs to know the *HOWs* and *WHYs* of the plan, and how they will complement each other during the course of the fight.

The Issue

1. The 13F Advanced Noncommissioned Officer's Course does not prepare an SFC to be involved in the MDMP. Fire Support Officers (FSOs) and the maneuver staffs need to understand this. In many ways, the FSNCO's level of proficiency comes solely from mentoring by his FSO. Even the Sergeants Major Academy's Battle Staff Course does not get to the level of planning that most Battalion/Task-Force staffs achieve when preparing for a battle. An FSNCO can be a very knowledgeable and hard-charging individual, but he still lacks the knowledge to pull simple things from a brigade operations order (OPORD) for the FSO's mission analysis briefing. This is in part because he does not understand the concept of the ongoing staff estimate; in most cases, no one has trained the FSNCO in what is needed for the mission analysis briefing. Telling the FSNCO to extract from the brigade OPORD what he thinks the FSO will need for the mission analysis briefing will usually end in disappointment for the FSO.

2. FSOs should expect their Fire Support Noncommissioned Officers to understand the orders process. However, only when the FSE is deployed does the FSO realize that his FSNCO lacks the knowledge to participate with him and the Battalion/Task Force staff during the MDMP. By then it is far too late to teach the FSNCO the orders process because of the high CTC OPTEMPO. FSOs and maneuver staffs also rely on the targeting officer to start the planning process while the FSO is attending the brigade OPORD. This is not wrong, as the targeting officer must be able to accomplish events, such as mission analysis; however, a trained FSNCO is necessary for a fully functional staff FSE and maneuver TOC.

3. For some it is simply a matter of involvement. The FSNCO needs to get involved with the MDMP process. It is not just the FSO's job to attend the MDMP, it is also the FSNCO's job to attend and participate. It clearly states in **FM 6-20-40,** ***TTPs for Fire Support Brigade Operations, Heavy,*** and **FM 6-20-50,** ***TTPs for Fire Support Brigade Operations, Light*** (Figure 1), that the FSNCO must be able to perform all functions of the FSO. This task should not be left with the targeting officer. The Battalion/Task Force FSNCO must open **FM 101-5,** ***Army Planning and Orders Production,*** to understand the orders process. The FSNCO needs the same training that most Battalion/Task-Force staffs have prior to a major deployment. Thus, he can watch, ask questions and understand the different steps of the MDMP. Only after the FSNCO has begun to understand this planning process can he begin to use the knowledge gained throughout his career to integrate fires with maneuver.

Battalion Fire Support Sergeant Duties

The battalion fire support sergeant is the senior enlisted assistant to the battalion FSO. The fire support sergeant serves as the FSO in his absence. He is responsible for the training of enlisted personnel of the battalion FSE and three maneuver FISTs. He advises the FSO on the FIST fire support sergeants' performance of NCO-related duties. He supervises the maintenance of all equipment assigned to these sections. The battalion fire support sergeant must be able to perform all the duties of his FSO.

Figure 1

A Solution

1. Hopefully, in the near future, the 13F Advanced Noncommissioned Officers' Program of Instructions (POIs) will cover the MDMP at the level of detail that the Battalion/Task Force NCO must understand. Eventually, we could combine a week of the Field Artillery Officer's Advanced Course, and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer's Course so that artillery officers and artillery NCOs can work and learn together. This would help in many ways. It would allow both the officer and NCO to understand each other's roles in the orders process at the Battalion/Task Force and even at the brigade levels. It would also force the NCO to realize that he is an integral part of the orders process within the Battalion/Task Force and is not just there to set up the TOC and update maps.

2. The Battalion/Task Force FSO needs to train his Fire Support NCO during the plan and preparation phase for deployment. A simple training plan can include only the FSO and FSNCO, or possibly the bde FSO and FSNCO could implement a series of combined OPD/NCOPDs on the subject. The bottom line is that the FSO must train his FSNCO on the MDMP (see Figure 2 on page 38); otherwise, do not expect him to understand it. Unfortunately, there is no formal training available to the fire support NCO. For the FSNCOs that feel slighted by the idea of being trained by an officer or suggest that this is really not their job, I suggest they step back, and re-evaluate themselves as an NCO. The FSO must ensure that the maneuver staff understands the importance of having the FSNCO at the table during the planning process. The Fire Support Sergeant brings such technical expertise and years of experience to the table during the Battalion/Task Force planning process as capabilities of the company FIST and the knowledge and experience of his personnel. He is the technical expert and knows the capabilities of the equipment within his platoon. Ensure that the FSNCO participates in the train-ups that the FSO and maneuver staff have at home station. If this does not happen, the FSNCO becomes another NCO in the TOC and not a fully integrated executor in the maneuver and fire support plans.



Figure 2

3. The most immediate solution lies with the FSNCO. He needs to fully realize his role as a fire support expert in the planning process. The FSNCO must ask questions aggressively and participate in home-station training with the Battalion/Task Force staff. Understanding the MDMP is the first step; watching it put into action at the Battalion/Task Force level is the next step. The more the FSNCO participates, the more knowledgeable he will be on the planning. The FSNCO must ask the FSO to sit down and explain in detail how the supported maneuver unit does the planning process. Ensure the FSO and the maneuver staff understand that the fire support NCO plans to participate in the train-ups that the unit executes on the orders process. DO NOT be intimidated because this is usually an officer function on the maneuver side.

In Conclusion

The sooner we give our Fire Support NCOs the proper formal instruction on how the MDMP works the better. At this time, we are not setting up our SFCs for success in the orders process at the Battalion/Task Force level, and, therefore, most are not very successful in this position when deployed to a combat scenario at the CTCs. The Battalion/Task Force FSNCO is a position which most 13F NCOs will hold during their career. We must ensure these NCOs are successful by educating them in NCOES. All Field Artillery officers and NCOs must demand this training from the schoolhouse.

Officers, train your NCOs to fully understand your position as the FSO, as well as their duties and responsibilities as the FSNCO. Do not let the targeting officer do the job of the FSNCO. The FSNCO should be your right-hand man, capable of filling your shoes in your absence. This is not the targeting officer's duty. You, as the FSO, will have a more knowledgeable and capable FSNCO during deployments. The FSNCO will also be an integral part of the planning team and will be trusted by the maneuver staff to make the tough decisions in your absence.

NCOs, stand your ground and be a part of your maneuver unit's MDMP during their orders process. Continue to learn and grow as a fire supporter by understanding the units we support -- MANEUVER. Otherwise, you will be misused as just another soldier in the TOC to update maps.✪

WARGAME PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

by LTC Roy Krueger, Senior Maneuver O/C, Bde C², JRTC

Probably the most difficult collective planning event your staff will do is the course-of-action analysis, or the wargame. The old saying, "Practice makes perfect" does *not* apply to wargaming, but the thought that practice will definitely cut down the time involved and produce a better product is true. ***Unfocused practice,*** however, does not achieve the training results most commanders, XOs, and S-3s desire. An example of unfocused practice could be the XO or S-3 quickly reviewing some doctrinal points with the staff, such as "Here are the eight steps of wargaming" and recapping some products their unit expects to develop from the wargame. From this review, they leap into a planning process, do a wargame, and relearn that the wargame can be a painful, slow event.

There is a wealth of material that talks processes, systems, and doctrinal guidelines for how to prepare for, and conduct, a wargame. Usually these sources focus on doctrinal generalities, or a specific area with the author's recommended solution. Generalities usually state "Do this" or "Do that" without giving the reader a "How to." Most articles focus on one issue that still leaves questions on other aspects of the wargame unanswered, and may never address key-related wargame areas that must be first integrated, then synchronized, to truly get the entire picture. Few sources get into the nuts and bolts on the full spectrum of conducting the wargame.

Focused practice, with an individual and collective train-up leading into the military decision-making process (MDMP), will give you better results than a quick doctrinal overview. It involves both training staff members on the systems and processes your unit uses as well as getting with them one-on-one or in small groups and going over the "How to's" of the various products you want them to produce. Once the staff member understands the end state for products he is to produce, he is able to start focusing on his key task of how to get there. Wargaming step 1, "gather the tools," is much more than getting the physical setup ready. It involves the staff doing detailed preparation for the wargame. Fleshing out their estimates with the necessary coordination and integration needed for the various critical events (as well as the things before, in-between, and after the critical events!) must occur if you are to have an effective and efficient wargame. Staff members must understand what needs to be synchronized in the wargame. Given this, they can do preliminary analysis, which will enable them to succinctly and accurately discuss their BOS/functional area issues during the wargame. The staff will never get to this state of proficiency if they are not trained individually and small group collectively before they do "the big one."

This article looks at the doctrinal wargame products detailed in **FM 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operations,*** and discusses each in detail, with the goal of defining planning considerations and looking at how staffs, events, and products are related to each other. Trainers and staff members should be able to read through this and have a better understanding of the question every new staff member has, "Just what is it, exactly, I am supposed to coordinate with these other guys?!" This article will not answer everything. It does relate issues to each other, and it provides a large number of planning considerations. The considerations should be consciously thought through before stating that an event has been prepared for and war-gamed "good enough."

The following 30 steps from **FM 101-5** can be read separately or as part of the entire thought process. Where appropriate, I have referred to closely related subjects by paragraph number.

1. *Refining or modifying the course of action (COA), to include identifying branches and sequels that become on-order or be-prepared missions.*

Ideally, your COA meets the general doctrinal criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishably, and completeness. After meeting these criteria, your COA may still turn out to be unsatisfactory, but it gives you a benchmark from which to start. A good relative combat power analysis, coupled with your Commander's guidance, should form most of your criteria for judging the worth of the COA. The wargame may show you flaws where you thought few or none existed. Most weaknesses of a good COA can be fixed with relatively small changes to the plan, but sometimes you realize that your COA has major weaknesses. If so, you will need to make drastic changes to the COA. Common reasons flaw discovery occurs:

A. The original COA was just thrown together, with little analyzed, multi-battlefield operating systems (BOS) thought put into it.

B. Late-breaking intelligence confirming or denying priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) or the enemy COA.

C. A significant change in friendly combat power available, or to the friendly situation in general.

Better to make the fix now than to hope the problem just goes away. Ideally, your refinements should be "tweaks" to the COA, but if a major change is needed, make everyone aware of it and give time to the staff to do further analysis on the impact before continuing the wargame.

A *"branch"* is defined as "*A contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions as determined by the wargaming process*" **(FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics).*** These are usually *"Be Prepared To"* missions.

A ***"sequel"*** is defined as "*Major operations that follow the current major operation. Plans for these are based on the possible outcomes (victory, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation*" (FM 101-5-1). These are usually *"On-Order"* missions.

I recommend that identified branches be issued to units not later than (NLT) the rehearsal, and preferably at the order. A good technique for a (bare minimum) product to issue is a complete COA sketch and statement that clearly defines what event will trigger the branch plan. Include task organization changes, if applicable.

As part of your brigade mission analysis, the CDR should decide what is enough and what is too much for subordinate units to plan. Not including all of the higher HQs' mission-essential taskings in the brigade order would cause the staff to identify a sequel that must be worked on as soon as the initial operations order (OPORD) is issued. This could be noted under coordinating instructions with a bullet such as, "On order (or be prepared to) continue the attack east to destroy remaining elements of the mechanized infantry battalion (MIB) to seal off the enemy penetration at Ferry Hills."

2. *Refining location and timing of the decisive point.*

Ideally, you start your COA development with a clear idea of what the decisive point is for the mission. FM 101-5-1 gives two applicable definitions:

A. "*A point, if retained, that provides a commander with a marked advantage over his opponent. Decisive points are usually geographic in nature but could include other physical elements, such as enemy formations, command posts, and communications nodes*."

B. "*A time or location where enemy weakness is positioned that allows overwhelming combat power to be generated against it. It could be an enemy weakness to be exploited or a time when the combat potential of the enemy force is degraded*."

The commander may have identified other decisive points which will become the nucleus of the missions you give subordinate units. Initial COA development focuses on events happening around the decisive point (such as actions on the objective). The wargame should assist you in refining how you will attack the decisive point. Worst case, you may realize the development plan really isn't a good development plan. That may have little impact on the plan, but it does change your focus somewhat. Other brigade critical events will develop from the wargame, some of which may become the decisive point for subordinate units.

3. *Identifying key or decisive terrain and determining how to use it.*

These terrain features should be identified during mission analysis (the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) portion, focusing on observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach (OCOKA)), primarily from the maneuver, intelligence, and engineer BOS analysis. COA development should incorporate these terrain features into the scheme of maneuver. By FM 101-5-1 definition, decisive terrain (…*To designate terrain as* decisive *is to recognize that the successful accomplishment of the mission, whether offensive or defensive, depends on seizing or retaining it. The* commander designates decisive terrain to communicate its importance *in his concept of operations, first to his staff and, later, to subordinate commanders)* must be at the heart of the COA or the COA is not suitable.

Key terrain *(Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant*) is ignored at your own risk. The S-2 and Engineer should identify how the enemy control of key terrain will impact on your mission, while the S-3 should be able to exploit that terrain to hurt the enemy. Determining how to use or gain and maintain control of this terrain is an important step during COA development and wargaming. The S-3 will typically overlook this terrain if it is not highlighted in some manner, with the importance of the terrain articulated in a manner that can be tactically dealt with.

4. *Refining the enemy event template and matrix.*

Event templating is a systemic weakness for brigades conducting operations at JRTC. Observation shows that most S-3s use situation templates while developing their COAs, but units often do not create or use an event template until late in planning. Historically, the S-2's situation templates are generally correct, but are just a snapshot in time and usually the current enemy situation template at the start of the S-2's briefing. Based on analysis of historical data, the current enemy situation, the S-2 should be continually assessing and updating the two

COAs; most likely and most dangerous. The vast majority of the S-2's effort during mission execution is confirmation or denial of templated threat COAs. By continuously updating threat COAs based on current intelligence, the S-2 can then develop a draft event template prior to mission analysis brief. *"The differences between named areas of interest (NAIs), indicators, and target position locations (TPLs) associated with each COA form the basis of the event template. The event template is a guide for collection and reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning. It depicts where to collect the information that will indicate which COA the threat has adopted*" **(FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield).*** The associated event matrix that goes with the graphic provides the *"…details on the type of activity expected in each NAI, the times the NAI is expected to be active, and its relationship to other events on the battlefield. Its primary use is in planning intelligence collection; however, it serves as an aid to situation development as well.*"

The S-2 should have his first draft of the event template completed before the mission analysis brief starts. It will get refined continuously, especially during the wargame, as well as when NAI activities are confirmed/denied. It is important for staffs to remember that the S-2 fight against the friendly COA in the wargame will most likely modify the event template and can cause changes in the enemy most dangerous (and most probable) COA.

The "reverse BOS" technique is absolutely essential for the situation template (SITEMP) and event template to be all they can be. Reverse BOS means each staff officer has a responsibility to assist the S-2 in refining the enemy BOS picture. For this technique to work, the S-2 must first brief the staff on the enemy's mission, give a brief description of the enemy's scheme of maneuver, and desired end state. This helps to ensure the "threat BOS" is synchronized and integrated. For instance, the engineer should be able to talk enemy employment of minefields, likely places they will be employed, composition, likely resupply caches and how the enemy places observation and fires on it. The Air Defense Officer can talk enemy air avenues of approach, types of enemy aircraft and their planning considerations for flight, likely or historical flight patterns and times. The fire support officer (FSO) could pinpoint terrain where templated mortars could easily fire from as well as good cache sites. The Civil Affairs officer can give an excellent assessment of the local civilian population and how their day-to-day patterns could impact the mission. The S-2 section assesses all this information and builds it into the master SITEMP and then event template. The XO should ensure that all appropriate staff coordinate with the S-2 prior to the mission analysis brief and then continually follow-through based on intelligence updates.

5. *Refining task organization, to include forces retained in general support (GS) of the command*.

The brigade staff should have broken down the task organization of assets during COA development, but there are almost always questions on the placement of many of the slice elements. Staff officers must come to the wargame prepared to discuss their elements' actions based on either the mission of the headquarters the element is assigned to, or the mission given directly to the element. As the battle is war-gamed collectively, a need to change the initial planned task organization may appear, to include changes in combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Supporting techniques:

A. During mission analysis, all available combat power is listed on a troop list chart, immaterial of task organization. This chart becomes a management tool to ensure that all available forces are allocated and can be as simple as a butcher paper with all task-organized units listed on it. As units are task-organized, they get checked off the chart.

B. If the S-3 chooses to only highlight some of the units on the COA sketch, the other staff must still note where their assets will be tentatively task-organized, along with recommended command and support relationships.

C. The wargame will draw out all sorts of situations based on the S-2's portrayal of the enemy. Some of these changes will include changing task organization, timing of an event or given task organization change, and the command/support relationship involved. Individual staff members must record all appropriate details as it pertains to their portion of the BOS. These details are critical; if not written down, it is likely the staff member will forget to include some in his portion of the OPORD. The assistant S-2 and MICO should record and adjust collection assets to ensure the proper "eyes" are able to ascertain key indicators to confirm or deny a particular enemy COA.

D. A master recorder should be identified to write down the task organization changes as they occur, as well as identified taskings. Do this in a manner so the entire staff can see it. By the end of the wargame, the task organization annex will be complete.

E. Clarify the command and support relationships (remember to *"Qualify relationships other than attached by using parenthetical terms (for example, operational control (OPCON),General Support (GS),…If possible, show all command and support relationships in the task organization."*) (FM 101-5, p F-3.) Many units at JRTC sporadically highlight these relationships, and annexes often contradict what the task organization annex indicates.

6. *Identifying tasks the unit must retain and tasks to be assigned to the subordinate commanders*.

What tasks require brigade commander decisions and which are for his subordinates? Most of these answers will fall out of the wargame, or will at least become questions to ask the Commander if he is not present. An example of a retained task might be executing a planned air volcano—the commander may choose to reserve the decision of timing and location for himself.

Tasks assigned to subordinate units usually fall out of three primary sources:

A. The mission analysis and Commander's Guidance.
B. COA development.
C. Wargaming.

Having three sources means you must have a system of tracking previously identified taskings. Someone must keep track of these tasks and ensure that they get assigned to a unit. All tasks could be tracked by one individual on a master board or list; or, each staff officer could maintain a master list which could be reviewed by the XO. Your next challenge is to ensure the staff captures the appropriate information during the wargame. The synchronization matrix is a good tool (see step 8), but it often does not capture all the details. Staff officers should individually keep track of BOS/functional area requirements. Use of the sketch-note technique, as spelled out in numerous articles and FM 101-5 is a good supplemental way of recording wargame results. This technique also serves to reinforce making the staff fully go through action, reaction, and counteraction.

7. *Allocate combat, CS, and CSS assets to subordinate commanders to accomplish their missions*.

(See step 5.) A common mistake units make at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is that they give the main effort a "bunch of stuff" to help them in their mission, greatly increasing the commander's span of command. These additional units are often allocated with little thought about telling the unit WHY they were given the unit. For instance, if you attach a combat observation and laser team (COLT) to a batallion (Bn) it may have been for the express purpose of overwatching a specific brigade directed obstacle in the battalion sector. If so, tell them (that was an easy one). If you give a large proportion of the CA and PSYOP teams to a Bn, you must provide the Bn with a purpose on why they were given all the assets ("Go out and interface with the locals," or the ever-popular "Conduct CMO Operations" is not sufficient guidance. "The purpose of civil affairs (CA) activities from D-DAY through D+2 is to identify what humanitarian needs the villages of X and Y have that our unit can help them with. I want your assessment on the feasibility of what is needed and what you think we can do, by 0800 on D+3. I also want passive collection to focus on whether the enemy has been using these villages as a supply source" is an example of giving specific guidance that should indirectly or directly tie in with the tactical plan.). Assets should be allocated to a unit to help them in specific areas. These areas are not always clear to the receiving unit, so instead of keeping secrets, write the purpose into the order.

On the other hand, there will be times when you give an asset to a Bn knowing it could use that asset any number of ways and you think, "Let them figure it out." Still a wrong answer! Brigade owes its subordinates a nested concept of the effects to be achieved with the BOS or functional area. This can be a broad concept or fairly specific, but it drives home the why, or purpose, behind the task organization.

My remaining point on this issue concerns force protection. Specifically, security (or lack of) for small slice elements placed on the battlefield should be based on a conscious decision. A four-man Sentinel radar, coupled with a retransmit site or TLQ-32, does *not* provide a base cluster defense. These assets are usually manned with just enough manpower to give them 24-hour capability. By grouping them together with no dedicated security element, a brigade has simply clustered potential enemy high payoff targets in one spot. Who is responsible for securing these positions, especially when the slice units may not even be at 100-percent strength?

8. *Developing a synchronization matrix and decision support template*.

(See Step 6.) The synchronization matrix is one of several tools you can use to record the wargame. It is important that after you record the enemy and friendly set for a given event, then go through action, reaction, and counteraction, you capture decision points (both friendly and enemy), updated CCIR, and time and loss estimates. Look at the battlefield from the viewpoint of all the moving parts (don't lump all your maneuver elements under "maneuver;" different units are doing different things). After the "set" is determined, go through friendly action, enemy reaction, and friendly counteraction. You could continue with follow-on reaction and counteraction -- there is no constraint, except for time. Although you will read and hear different interpretations of how to work this process, I think the best technique is to lay out the sets on your map sheet or board, then always have friendly units start the action, followed by enemy reaction, then friendly counteraction. (Two physical setup techniques include the standard map drop on the wall and putting the map or a terrain model on a flat surface.)

Why? Your goal is to do something to the enemy, knowing that he will react in some manner, then determine how you can counter his reaction to hurt him even more, or at least minimize your losses. If you start by talking

through an enemy action, then you must talk your reaction, enemy counteraction, and then your reaction to the enemy's counteraction. This second technique takes longer than my preferred technique.

It is during this process where the meat of targeting occurs, which should be captured by a combination of recording the notes and filling in the Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM). Observer to named area of interest (NAI) or high payoff target (HPT), firing system attacking the target, where and when, based on movement rates and time required to put fires on target, are examples of how you build targeting into this procedure. These are details easily lost if not recorded on the synch matrix or another tool. Lost details translate into misplaced taskings and a de-synchronized plan that does not inflict pain on the enemy by attacking his critical vulnerabilities.

Another way of considering the action, reaction, counteraction drill is to think about it like this: the action and reaction basically talk through how the friendly plan fights the enemy commander's plan (a talk-through of how we see the fight going). The counteraction really defines the changes, deletions, and/or additions to our friendly plan based on a better way to kill the enemy. If you get through a wargamed event and you have no changes to your original plan plus you have no targeting refinements, chances are you did no counteraction. Good targeting leads to good decision points, which get recorded on the synch matrix and are then converted into a Decision Support Template (DST) and a Decision Support Matrix (DSM). Another technique is a long-hand operational schedule, which basically lays out a projected sequence of numbered events based on friendly and enemy maneuver. Decision points are written into the operational schedule and they reference branches and sequels by number. Operational schedules are very common for air assault operations.

The Decision Support Template/Decision Support Matrix is a superior tool, IF THE COMMAND GROUP USES IT. (FM 101-5-1 defines the *DST* as, "*A staff product initially used in the wargaming process which graphically represents the decision points and projected situations and indicates when, where, and under what conditions a decision is most likely to be required to initiate a specific activity…or event.*" It defines *decision point* as, "*An event, an area, a line, or a point on the battlefield where tactical decisions are required resulting from the wargaming process before the operations order. Decision points do not dictate commander's decisions; they only indicate that a decision is required, and they indicate when and where the decision should be made to have the maximum effect on friendly or enemy courses of action.*") If you do not use the DST, don't waste your time making one. With that said, the DST and matrix are very useful to both the commander and to his subordinates. It defines events (or times) when the commander must make a critical decision, and it cannot be beat as a memory jogger, especially when a supporting matrix is used. It can be built with sketch and matrix on one page, stuffed into a pocket, and used easily when needed. The DST/DSM should be prominently posted in the command posts so the staff can see a DP coming and prepare any relevant staff information needed for the commander *before* he asks for it. Subordinates can use it as a guide to cue them when they can expect a key decision to come from higher. The DST enables the commander and his staff to fight in a proactive, versus reactive, manner. While the benefits of using this tool are many, the lack of a DST (or a suitable substitute) can cause you to lose the fight.

9. ***Estimating the duration of critical events as well as of the entire operation.***

Estimates on timing should be completed prior to the wargame by the various staff officers who have critical events that their staff sections are responsible for planning. Examples of this include breach times (ENG), smoke buildup and duration (CHEM, FSO), movement times and actions on the objective (S-3,S-4). The wargame brings all of these various time factors together. Ideally, the S-3 will know most of the critical times based on COA development, but usually times will not get fully refined and synchronized until the wargame. During the wargame, each staff member must be able to articulate his time constraints and/or requirements. If he was unable to coordinate with other key staff prior to the wargame, he must be prepared to quickly talk coordination issues at this time. The XO should be the honest broker in judging impacts of time estimates, looking at where other portions of the plan may be affected. The S-3 must be sensitive to other BOS/functional area requirements that may force him to modify his plan. A common JRTC problem during the conduct of the wargame is fighting combat multipliers without thinking through how or when a particular asset must move to be at the right place at the right time. Wishing for a problem to go away ***will not*** make it better.

A common critical event NOT often wargamed is suppress, obscure, reduce, and secure (SOSR). A breach force has to penetrate through a deep obstacle. A support force has been positioned to suppress the enemy, allowing the breach to create a vehicle lane for a mixed Light/Heavy assault force to move through. When does the support element need to be in position? What enemy will they need to suppress for how long? Who controls obscuration, when does it need to begin, and how long does it need to last? Who provides the obscuration (if an indirect system provides smoke, how long will that system be unable to fire high explosive (HE) and how long will it take them to get effective obscuration in place? Will terrain and enemy positioning cause the support force to move to be able to continue providing suppressive fire? Does this mean obscuration will be needed at another location? Control measures and taskings within the order must clarify the requirements defined through this thought process.

Another commonly miscalculated critical time involves the employment of Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM). Using FA ADAM-RAAM munitions as an example, consider the following events that need a timing estimate. When an HPT enters an NAI, how long will it take the observer to identify the HPT? Who does he call, and how long before the decisionmaker receives the request for fire? How long to make the decision and then to send the decision to the firing unit? How long to ready the FA to fire, to shoot the rounds, and to have the rounds arm? How long do we think it will take for the HPT to move from NAI to TAI? Does the minefield arm prior to arrival of the HPT? If the answer is "Yes," good. If the answer is "No," something must change.

These are examples of basic staff estimates that should be thought out before the wargame to allow the XO and S-3 to spend time synchronizing efforts versus determining what needs to get done and when.

10. ***Projecting the percentage of total enemy forces defeated in each critical event, and overall.***

There are a great many ways to determine this, with each staff tending to estimate losses based on its own internal developed technique. The most important thing the staff should remember is that whatever technique/formula it uses, the staff should use it consistently throughout the wargame. This same technique/formula should also be used to estimate friendly losses during combat. Someone must record the estimated losses and general locations, then periodically summarize current strength and discuss culminating points as appropriate. One benefit of consistently tracking enemy losses is that it will allow the S-2 to determine how his enemy event template may change. *NOTE:* Often S-3s and XOs get frustrated when the S-2 starts to fight a different battle plan than

what he originally briefed. There are six perspectives that dominate the battlefield and lead to the frustration in both the S-2/S-3.

A. Overview of ourselves.
B. The enemy's view of himself.
C. Our view of the enemy.
D. The enemy's view of us.
E. What we think the enemy sees.
F. What the enemy thinks we see.

If the changes in the SITEMP and event template are based on the friendly array of forces, or enemy losses, we must be flexible enough to deal with this. If the S-2 changes the entire enemy plan because of a whim, then the XO has a problem he must fix quickly.

11. *Identifying likely times and areas for enemy use of WMD and friendly NBC defense requirements*.

Generally, the S-2 and the Chemical Officer will have identified likely times, areas, purpose or desired effect, delivery system and agent types for enemy use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) either during Mission Analysis or COA development. The other staff should consider this template as they refine the COA, particularly in regards to templated friendly positions. The S-2 and/or chemical officer (CHEMO) must fight this template, no matter how ugly it gets, so the friendly forces can determine their counteractions. The priority for consideration of counteractions should follow the three principles of NBC defense: avoidance, protection and decontamination. It is easier to avoid WMD than to increase mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) or conduct decontamination operations. The counteractions will include both passive and active measures, ranging from deception, pre-positioning of NBC equipment, covering supplies that can't be decontaminated, identification of reconnaissance assets to confirm or deny enemy use of WMD, changing planned locations for units or events, to task organization of chemical assets and boundary changes. (*NOTE:* A JRTC trend is that the FOX reconnaissance vehicles are rarely integrated into the R&S plan, due to no good reason.)

WMD use is a good area to think about how you do action, reaction, and counteraction. Friendly has their plan *(action)*, as briefed in the initial discussion of the event. The enemy (S-2) talks his *reaction* to our plan. This is the point where many staffs stop discussion, yet the *counteraction* is arguably the most important part of wargaming. This is the step where the staff says, "Holy cow, I didn't realize that!" and they determine what items from their original plan need to be changed to either minimize their losses or to turn the tables onto the enemy. At the JRTC we will often hear a statement similar to, "The enemy will use WMD on the 155 platoon or a 105 battery." General timing of this templated attack is noted, then the staffs often move on. The XO, S-3 and other staff should be immediately asking some questions, such as:

A. Do I need to conduct a survivability move to protect this asset? When? How will the resulting "downtime" impact on other requirements?
B. Where is the contaminated casualty point located? How will this unit move contaminated casualties there?
C. What "dirty route" will be used? Will contamination on that route cause other units to change their maneuver or CSS plans?
D. Can higher HQ provide us any assistance for chemical decontamination or NBC reconnaissance?

E. Will we be able to request or use some other asset to continue the missions the contaminated unit may no longer be able to do?

The ultimate NBC counteraction is the conduct of decontamination operations. Decontamination operations are only conducted when time and assets are available. There are three levels of decontamination, as outlined in **FM 3-5, *NBC Decomtamination.*** These are immediate, operational and thorough.

A. ***Immediate decontamination*** only allows the unit to continue operations in MOPP IV and limits the spread of contamination. These are individual soldier tasks.

B. ***Operational decontamination*** only allows temporary relief of MOPP, is a battalion-level operation, and can be conducted with or without chemical unit augmentation.

C. ***Thorough decontamination*** is the only way to completely remove MOPP gear and is a brigade-level operation. It requires support not only from the Chemical Decontamination Platoon, but also from engineers, a unit for local security, contaminated unit decontamination teams, resupply of water, decontaminants, MOPP gear and any class of supply that can't be decontaminated, and probably casualty decontamination and treatment. Transportation assets may involve the forward support battalion (FSB) or AVN BN to get supplies to the decontamination site. The patient decontamination team from the FSB medical company would benefit from being located at the thorough decontamination site. Decontamination is CSS intensive and requires detailed planning to ensure that any supplies that can't be decontaminated are replaced (i.e., canvas, food, Class IV, water).

Without a brigade plan that is coordinated and integrated prior to the wargame, then talked through as part of a critical event, WMD use can stop the battle now, in favor of the enemy. A common trend seen at JRTC is that this product of wargaming gets overlooked because it is "too hard to do." What that statement really means is that no one has bothered to think through the requirements to conduct NBC defense. The time to learn about NBC is *not* when half of your tactical operations center (TOC) is twitching on the ground because of a nerve agent attack.

12. *Identifying the location and commitment of the reserve*.

This item can (and should) be looked at in two ways -- the enemy reserve and the friendly reserve. For the enemy reserve, we base our fight on the S-2's event template and SITEMP locations. As the S-2 fights the battle against the friendly COA, he is likely to refine the commitment criteria, the timing, and the expected strength of the enemy reserve. The S-2 should, at a minimum, determine one or more enemy commander decision points for the commitment and expected target of the reserve. These decision points may now tie into friendly commander decision points designed to get into the enemy commander's decision cycle.

The S-3 will have a templated location for placement and composition of the friendly reserve. As the battle is war-gamed, he may discover several things by looking at how the enemy fights and by doing some time/space analysis. A consideration often not thought of is this, "What is the threat that will require my use of the reserve, and what is the needed composition of the reserve to deal with that threat?" All too often in the defense, a brigade will designate the armor/mechanized team as the reserve throughout planning, preparation, and execution. Although a good likely candidate as the reserve against an armored attack (defense execution), this task organization is not adequate to deal with a (dismounted) PSOC or CLF threat that fights from the rough, NO-GO terrain.

The reserve should have several brigade-approved axes for a counterattack (ending in an attack-by-fire position, usually), possibly several tentative battle positions, passage points, phase lines, and other graphic control measures as needed for when they pass into another unit's sector. Because reserve operations will typically involve two or more subordinate elements, the brigade is obligated to plan these graphics. A technique is for the reserve commander to coordinate on the ground with the receiving unit, then pass these graphics back to brigade for

approval. The drawback to this technique is that the more we force the reserve commander to coordinate on the ground (remember that this commander is likely a company commander or platoon leader with no staff to support him), the less time he has to spend doing TLP with his unit. The other feasible option is for brigade to plan the control measures, then refine them based on ground reconnaissance by the executors.

13. ***Identifying the most dangerous enemy course of action***.

The enemy's most dangerous COA, as briefed during mission analysis, should be refined considerably during both COA development and analysis. This refinement is based primarily on one subject, which is "Where did the commander choose to assume risk, *and what is the risk he chose to assume?"* The initial, mission analysis MDCOA did not take into account the friendly force arrayal. The friendly COA chosen may lend itself to a totally different enemy MDCOA. The S-2 should have a good feel for where the brigade is assuming risk prior to the wargame. This will allow him to modify/update the enemy most dangerous COA. If time permits, the most dangerous COA should also be war-gamed. At a minimum, the S-2 must identify the enemy commander's decision point where he moves into the most dangerous COA. A branch plan to counter this should be developed by the S-3, even if it is completed after the OPORD is over.

14. ***Identifying the location of the commander and unit command posts***.

The Signal Officer can give good communications advice in this arena, but he is rarely the staff officer best suited to develop the C^2 plan. The issue of locating command posts is bigger than just determining where the commander needs to be on the battlefield and when. (See "Six TOC Functions" and "Five Elements of Command and Control".) This plan involves several key planning considerations, which should be answered by the Commander/XO/S-3 prior to developing the C^2 plan. Considerations include:

A. What decisions will be required from a given command post, when?
B. How many C^2 nodes are needed?
C. What is the purpose of the C^2 node? What specific missions/tasks is it overseeing?
D. Which node "has the battle," starting when? What are the standards associated with assuming the battle?
E. Who needs to be in the C^2 node?
F. What equipment is needed to support A and B above?
G. What subordinate elements are to report to what node when, on what net IDs?
H. What is the expected duration for when the node will be active? Does the manning and equipment support this requirement (24-hour capability versus short duration)?
I. What are the survivability requirements of this node (security force, AT weapons, digging in)?
J. What is the relationship of this node to other active nodes?

Common mistakes made by units include the following:

A. Underestimating the length of time the node will be operational.
B. Staff required to man the node or subordinate commanders do not know what specific net IDs are to be monitored by the node.

C. Appropriate staff members and equipment subject matter experts not present.
D. Node set up on a templated enemy avenue of approach; appropriate security not present.

Examples of some potential Brigade-level Command Posts:

A. Main CP.
B. Rear CP.
C. Tactical CP.
D. Convoy start point CP.
E. Convoy release point CP.
F. Support Operations/ALOC (Rear CP).
G. MICO CDR CP (if used forward).
H. Forward Logistics Element.
I. C^2 helicopter.
J. PZ Control.
K. A second Tactical CP.
L. Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group.

15. *Identifying additional critical events.*

The XO and S-3 should have determined these immediately after the commander approved the COA. The FM 101-5, p 5-18, definition: "*Critical events are those that directly influence mission accomplishment. They include events that trigger significant actions or decisions (commitment of an enemy reserve), complicated actions requiring detailed study (a passage of lines), and essential tasks identified during mission analysis*." Identifying critical events is a necessary step when determining what will be war-gamed. Getting this information out early to the staff allows them to prepare themselves and update their estimates based on specifics required for war-gaming. During the wargame itself, there may be critical events that get discovered, but these are relatively rare. Note that the importance of critical events is that they require a premium on multi-staff coordination, integration, and synchronization.

Ideally, you will have the time to war-game all identified critical events. However, time will not always be available. This causes the XO to prioritize the critical events and accomplish as many as possible. The sacrifice of quality over time spent on an event is related to the hard decision the XO must make. There may be some events that can wait until after the OPORD is to be war-gamed. Identify this fact in the order and, after completing the follow-on wargame, issue a FRAGO. In the event the staff cannot collectively complete all critical events, the XO should, at a minimum, get small working groups together with selected staff to war-game the event as best they can.

16. ***Identifying additional requirements for CS and CSS support.***

A common reality of planning in the field is that only select CS and CSS considerations get actively reviewed by the S-3 as he is initially developing the COA. This then requires good initiative on the part of staff officers in these BOS to determine where they fit in, to bring up critical information and analysis early to the XO and S-3, and to ensure it is considered in the COA development and expanded in the wargame. Two examples of additional requirements:

A. The impact of a controlled supply rate (CSR) for a critical munition. How much is on hand with what units, what is expected to be on hand at defend by or LD times, what can be cross-leveled, and what is the expected requirement for a given unit executing a given mission? Good analysis here, with guidance from the commander, could result in modifying the task organization, changing subordinate unit missions, the Commander personally talking to his higher Commander for help, or changing the scheme of maneuver. (***Note:*** The last issue with maneuver should not be a *major* issue if the S-4 did his homework for the mission analysis brief.)

B. During defensive planning, the engineer must look at numerous options for blade and manhours in terms of survivability and countermobility efforts. Initially discussed during mission analysis and considered during COA development, the preparation of the defensive battlefield takes on a new meaning as a wargame critical event. What assets travel what routes when, to do what work? How does travel time interact with the priorities of work (are we crossing and re-crossing the battlefield multiple times to simply follow a priority list, with the resultant wasted blade hours)? In what order must obstacles be emplaced, and how does that affect planned maneuver across the sector during preparation? Can CSS assets get required CL IV and CL V (mines) to the supply points or obstacle sites in time to support the manpower that will set it up? If defensive preparation is not war-gamed, the brigade has assumed a high risk that they will lose much valuable time due to the right things not being in the right places at the right times. This could result in units out of position, critical obstacles not emplaced, friendly casualties from friendly minefields (is there such a thing as a friendly minefield?), and poor sensor to shooter integration and synchronization.

The XO must take everyone who is not in the S-3's "core group" and ensure they remain focused on COA development issues, then ensure they get their input into the development in a timely manner. This approach makes participation in the wargame all the more important. Since the developed COA(s) may not have thoroughly integrated and accounted for all BOS issues, these issues must be discussed quickly and thoroughly during the appropriate critical event in wargaming.

A good technique to work integration issues with all the staff is to do the above, then get all the staff together so the S-3 can review the COA with them (once he has his baseline COA complete). Go around to each staff member and get his "major muscle movement" issues. This is a good time to capture task organization changes. When this is complete, the S-3 recaps the modified COA, then the XO gives wargame guidance to the staff so they can do their preliminary staff work.

As the staff gets into the wargame, it should become clear where casualties will occur, as well as locations for equipment or vehicle losses. This allows the S-1/S-4 to better plan how and where they need to place assets such as casualty collection points, ambulance transfer points, and maintenance collection points. The actions required by maneuver and CS units will also further define special logistical requirements needed for mission accomplishment. CS elements may possibly be reorganized, based on newly discovered needs, and the movement timing and placement of these assets should be refined.

Synchronization with the entire BOS is of utmost importance during the wargame, for if it does not get accomplished here, it will be very difficult to do later. FM 101-5-1 defines synchronization as, *"The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time."* FM 101-5 says, *"Synchronization is arranging activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point."* It further states, *"Though separated in time and space, these activities must be well synchronized if their combined effects are to be felt at the decisive time and place…In the end, the product of effective synchronization is maximum use of every resource to make the greatest contribution to success."*

17. *Determining requirements for deception and surprise*.

These requirements should be reviewed starting with the Commander's Guidance after the mission analysis brief, then incorporated into the COA development. If this does not happen, chances are that deception and surprise which get "built in" during the wargame will be relatively minor. Planned deception and surprise should be looked at along with everything else that is a part of the event you war-game. It is worthy as a separate line on the synchonization matrix, or could be discussed as part of the actions of the unit assigned to accomplish the deception or surprise.

Elements to consider for deception include the following:

A. Who is the deception target?

B. What is the deception objective? What do we want the target to believe? What does the target expect us to do? During what time period do we want to affect the enemy?

C. The deception story must be believable and reasonable. There must be a threat or opportunity to the target that it can act upon. **FM 33-1-1, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures,*** states, *"Deception must never seem incompatible or illogical with events that opponents have reason to expect."*

D. Feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays are four types of deception operations a tactical commander could use.

E. The Commander must be willing to put assets into the deception plan to make it work.

F. The unit must fully integrate and synchronize the deception with the chosen COA.

A good point to remember is that deception and surprise should be integrated along with everything else during COA development, then it gets synchronized during the wargame. This is not to say that integration or synchronization cannot happen at any other time, but COA development and analysis are custom made for integration and synchronization. Additional requirements may appear in the wargame, but baseline requirements should have been integrated into the plan from the beginning.

Deception does not need to be a grand, all-encompassing operations order in and of itself. Small tactical deceptions that are nested into the over-all scheme of maneuver create the conditions for success. Examples include:

A. False landing zones (LZs), or indicators that lead the enemy to believe insertions will be in one place when they really are occurring elsewhere.

B. The use of deception smoke on a critical trail junction where vehicles could move on two or more routes. Assuming this is an enemy commander decision point, we may be able to upset his decision cycle if he does not know which direction we went.

C. The conduct of a feint on an objective to draw enemy forces to one point, then attack from another direction.

18. ***Refining command and control (C^2) requirements, to include control measures and updated operational graphics***.

This task is relatively simple to do, but the staff should have a standing operating procedure (SOP) to explain how new control measures are added to the graphics. Many things will come out of a wargame that require specific placements of control measures, whether they are battle positions, restrictive fire control measures, checkpoints, or locations for communications checkpoints (CCPs). As staff officers realize they need something to control their portion of the battle, it should be recorded. New control measures should be consolidated and "quality controlled" by the XO or S-3 immediately after the wargame so all the staff understand what control measures will be used and can refer to the correct designations from a master graphic.

Additionally, the staff may realize they need additional C^2 assets on the ground for a given event (refer to Step 14 above). Command Post requirements align very closely with graphical control measure requirements.

19. ***Finalizing CCIR and IR with the Last Time Information is of Value (LTIOV).***

(See Step 21.) Although commonly associated with PIR, LTIOV is equally applicable to all CCIR. CCIR is defined as *"Information required by the commander that directly affects his decisions and dictates the successful execution of operational or tactical operations."* (FM 101-5-1) There will come a time in every plan where the potential use of information becomes irrelevant. Since CCIR is the preferred method to narrow down information, allowing the commander information he must have in a real hurry, useless CCIR should not be tracked by units once it reaches the LTIOV. A consideration for the planner is once LTIOV is reached, is that other information now becomes CCIR?

The S-2 should go into the wargame with estimated LTIOV. Based on action, reaction, and counteraction, much of this will get refined. To help ensure that the right collection asset is where it needs to be and when, the S-2 develops the Intelligence Synchronization Matrix (ISM). This is really just an expanded intelligence portion of the BOS synchronization matrix. As a result of the action, reaction and counter-action, intelligence requirements should be matched to the criteria to execute a decision identified in the wargame. The LTIOV timelines are determined from the DPs recorded on the DST. Additionally, the staff may realize that there are other Intelligence Requirements based on how the battle progresses in the wargame. This will allow the S-2 and S-3 to modify the collection plan (see Step 20). Another consideration is that the S-2 and S-3 could tie the LTIOV into *events* that will occur on the battlefield, versus *time.* The wargame should validate the collection plan.

20. ***Finalizing the reconnaissance and surveillance plan and graphics for the basis of the collection plan***.

(See Steps 19 and 21.) A draft R&S plan should have been given to the R&S executors by the conclusion of the COA development, or at least they should have received several R&S specific warning orders. Depending on the time requirements of needed information, it is possible that some of your R&S assets are already in the execution mode. For the purpose of discussion, I will assume that the unit has the ability to issue this plan to the R&S unit sometime after the wargame.



The R&S plan must be nested with the brigade's overall concept of the operation. It must also focus on answering CCIR first, then other IR if any assets are still available. The plan cannot be focused purely on the collection of information. All BOS must be considered in terms of how they can support the elements conducting R&S. Communications, resupply, casualty evacuation, infiltration and extraction means and routes, fire support, and potential linkup with the brigades maneuver forces must be considered. Brigades will sometimes put all of the R&S assets, to include battalion reconnaissance platoons, under brigade control and, at other times, battalions will be left to manage their own platoons. No matter how the units handle their command and control, all planning considerations still apply and brigade still must view this as a brigade operation.

Be very careful to not overtask units with multiple NAIs. Part of the mission analysis brief should define current capabilities of R&S assets, so the commander can give good priority of coverage guidance to the S-2 and S-3. The status of these assets will change over time, so it is a good technique to update changes in friendly assets available just before the wargame. The staff should also take the potential compromise of units into consideration during the wargame, so they can work out extraction and casualty evacuation plans.

21. ***Refining CCIR and incorporating them into the R&S plan and graphics***.

(See Steps 19 and 20.) Incorporation of CCIR into the R&S plan is primarily focused on PIR much more than FFIR and EEFI. However, some EEFI and FFIR may be directly related to the units conducting the R&S plan (planned LZs, routes, or objectives). Commander emphasis on EEFI may cause the planners to run into conflicts with gathering PIR (how can I gather information on the breach point or objective if the commander does not want to let the enemy know what his objective is?). A conflict like this will require the staff to get guidance from the commander on where he is willing to take risk, and it may drive the commander to modify his CCIR.

From the larger picture, the R&S plan is only part of the brigade concept of the operation. This means the staff cannot get so wrapped up in a war-gamed R&S critical event that they fail to note the impact of what the reconnaissance units are (or might be) doing on the rest of the plan. This is the reason why the S-3 must be involved in the plan from its birth -- it cannot be a stand-alone S-2 plan. The time to discover major conflicts is not during the *synchronization* process (COA analysis), it is during the *integration* process (COA development).

22. ***Developing fire support, engineer, air defense, information operations, and CSS plans and graphics***.

These plans should first be integrated during COA development, based on commander's guidance. Depending on the type of operation, certain BOS (especially CSS) typically are not able to finalize their planning until late in development, but that lateness makes this no less a critical step. The synchronization of these efforts is what should be focused on in the wargame. "If I do this, then that means you must first do this and I will need to have that before...." The staff looks at the initial planning, coordination, and integration efforts already completed as a collective whole, to see what other plans need to be refined.

A good technique for XOs to ensure the above listed assets (as well as the various other staff assets commonly found within a brigade, such as Military Police, PSYOP, CA, operational law) are focused early in both integration or COA development, in preparation for the wargame, is the following:



A. Based on the Commander's Guidance after mission analysis, the XO should have each staff section write out their respective concept of the operation. This is not always possible until the S-3 has a baseline maneuver COA sketched and written out. Initially developing a written concept of operations does force the staff to pay more attention to what is going on with the mission specific planning. Often most of the staff play a background role during initial COA development, so they have ample opportunity to begin drafting how they see their BOS conceptually supporting the maneuver plan. As the staff has the opportunity to provide input, they can quickly and articulately speak to supporting the plan, with the respective capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities that COA brings to the table.

B. The XO should review each written or sketched COA to ensure that it fits within both the Commander's Guidance and the specific maneuver COA it addresses. This is the step where many staff plans become unhinged -- their concept does not truly support what the commander wants, priorities are out of synch, or assets are generally poorly positioned. The S-3 must share in this responsibility -- he will review a few "Core BOS" concepts because they are so integral to his maneuver plan, while the XO polices up everything else to ensure the correct support is where it is needed, on time.

An example of a CSS concept paragraph for a battalion follows:

We will accomplish our CSS mission by operating in a split configuration for the battle, to more quickly support across the width of the BN sector. The combat trains will jump 4 hours prior to the defend by time to the vic of CP 7 (east of BP 4-2), while the forward aid station will move east of BP 4-3 at the same time. The main aid station will move to the NE of BP 4-1. Significant to this operation is our ability to get CL V into the cache points NLT 242200.

"Information Operations" scares many staffs, because it is an unknown, strange "thing." It is really a fancy title put on a sub-product of the MDMP, and, in many cases, it requires a much longer time period (than combat arms missions) to get an assessment and see the results. It uses the same systems we already have in place; it just requires different data to be inputted into the MDMP. Different staff officers will play key roles; i.e., the S-3 must make sure the plan supports maneuver, but he has little to do with the actual planning. The targeting synchronization process your unit uses should suffice as a procedure to continually process this information.

Reference all of the BOS, it is helpful for the staff to remember that a good enemy fights as a combined arms team just the same as the U.S. Army does. They will have different assets, capabilities, and limitations, but their goal is the same as ours. They will use their systems to the best of their capabilities, applying their strengths to our weaknesses while protecting their weaknesses from our strengths. As we integrate our BOS to achieve the common purpose, we must look across and attack the entire spectrum of the enemy. Our main effort may be to seize an objective, but prior to the attack we have positioned Stinger ambushes to destroy enemy resupply helicopters; we ambush their patrols; PSYOP attacks them mentally; CA, S-4, and OPLAW work with the host nation and local civilians to minimize their interference while maximizing support we can get from them.

Some common CSS concerns include the following questions: Do the CSS routes move through terrain already secured by friendly forces? Are locations within supporting distance of the supported units? Are assets positioned where they can do the most good for the mission? Do routes lead through friendly or enemy obstacles? At what time will obstacles become active? Do resupply vehicle drivers/TCs know about these obstacles? Are CSS locations away from enemy avenues of approach and potential LZs (air assault)? Do you want to be near an LZ for rotary-wing resupply operations? When and where will expected enemy reconnaissance assets go, and will it affect CSS operations? Have all positions avoided templated chemical areas? Does the dirty route (required when there is




a templated persistent area) avoid crossing the MSR? Does it lead from the templated point of contamination to a planned decontamination site linkup point? Is passive as well as active air defense considered when selecting (lucrative target) CSS locations? Do CSS positions avoid locating on friendly or likely enemy indirect fire targets? Are there any planned targets positioned so that CSS units could use them to call fires, if needed?

23. ***Identifying or confirming the locations of decision points, NAIs, TAIs, and the information needed to support the decision points***.

(See Step 28.) Many commanders will give guidance on where they see decision points on the battlefield. These decision points should always be tied in with CCIR. Given this, the staff has a start point for identifying supporting NAIs (named areas of interest) during COA development, as well as other potential NAIs. The wargame should look hard at where we want to target the enemy (targeted areas of interest -- (TAIs)), what we plan to target him with, then modify the location of NAIs. This modification will be based on how soon we must know of an enemy activity so we can obtain the planned effects of fires on the target at the TAI -- a necessary drill before and during the wargame.

Definitions from FM 101-5-1:

A. **TAI:** *"The geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction will cause the enemy to either abandon a particular COA or require him to use specialized engineer support to continue, where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not all TAIs will form part of the friendly COA; only TAIs associated with HPTs are of interest to the staff. These are identified during staff planning and wargaming. TAIs differ from engagement areas (EAs) in degree. EAs plan for the use of all available weapons; TAIs might be engaged by a single weapon. See FM 34-130."*

B. **NAI:** *"A point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity is expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity within an NAI will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action."*

C. **IR (Intelligence Requirement):** (IAW FM 34-130) *"An intelligence requirement of lower priority than the PIR of lowest priority."*

Decision points for the commander will be tied in with an NAI, or perhaps multiple NAIs that, when taken together, confirm or deny an enemy action. Multiple NAIs looking at IRs may be required to get the full picture of an enemy action. If needed, this should come out during the wargame. TAIs are where the result of the commander's decision, or a pre-planned action, will affect the enemy.

24. ***Determining the timing of force concentration and initiation of the attack or counterattack***.

Initial estimates on these subjects should have been worked out both in COA development and the staff preparation for the wargame. Modifications to the planned timing of events will come from two basic areas: how the S-2 fights the enemy with all of the resulting impact on friendly forces, and from detailed staff analysis that gives time estimates for critical enabling tasks to complete the given critical event. It is useful to determine what "force concentration" really means. Your assets must be in the right place at the right time to do the essential mission. This is massing effects. "Mass" is defined as, *"To concentrate or bring together fires, as to mass fires of*

multiple weapons or units." (FM 101-5-1). **FM 100-5**, ***Operations,*** has a better definition: *"Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time."* The key is to be able to put the desired effects on the enemy so he feels the effects at the decisive time. It does *not* imply you must get all of your units into one tight, small geographical area. It is also important that "massing" applies to all the BOS, not just fires. For instance, the effects of a jammer may be to force enemy artillery nets to not be responsive when ground maneuver attacks an enemy position. The effects are felt by the lack of indirect fires falling on friendly forces.

"Effects" has the broader mental affect of conceptually tying all available lethal and non-lethal fires together to create the conditions for mission accomplishment. As you war-game a given critical event, you will find that your desired effects may require something to happen either before or after this critical event takes place. This "something" must be built into the plan and war-gamed if time permits. At a minimum, the appropriate staff and the recorder must note the required actions so it does not get forgotten after the wargame is completed.

The S-2's event template will drive the timing of many friendly events. As the enemy commander (S-2 during the wargame) reaches his various decision points, the brigade is able to confirm or deny more of the SITEMP. This impacts on decisions the commander must make and should considerably help in refining CCIR (see Step 19). The S-2's reaction and counter-reaction show how the enemy will attack us. Force protection measures may require an additional adjustment to various timings. This helps drive the required synchronization of many events (see Step 23).

25. ***Developing the intelligence collection and dissemination plan***.

At brigade and battalion levels, the R&S plan is the *basis* for the collection plan because it is the tasking document for organic or attached assets the commander controls. In other words, a Brigade Commander can task a battalion or other unit to conduct R&S, but he cannot task a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to fly over his sector.

Once PIR and IR are refined, *SOR* (Specific Orders and Requests) are developed. The orders part is what a brigade and battalion generally include in their respective R&S plans. The "Requests" part goes to higher HQs, adjacent units, other agencies, or host-nation authorities. When agreements are worked out (1st Brigade will have Division UAV coverage from 021400-1800 JUN) the S-2 can add that to the collection plan.

The XO and S-3 must ensure that staff attention is given to the R&S plan. A technique is for staff "seconds" to work R&S issues while the primaries are focused on the overall plan. Always remember that the R&S plan is part of the overall plan. (See Step 21.)

26. ***Determining movement times and tables***.

(See Step 24.) Convoy movement is often planned by brigade CSS planners; the overall enemy and friendly situation surrounding the convoy routes will determine when the S-3 has to take a more active role. When planned by the S-4/CSS community, history shows that they will plan times and tables at a location separate from the Main CP. This, in turn, lends itself to a poorly prioritized movement flow, and the movement times do not take into account many factors involving timing at and around the release point. A way to fix this is to have a dedicated convoy planner at the wargame. The staff must highlight selected equipment that must come in early and the planned destinations. With the XO as the adjudicator, movement tables will be continually adjusted with all BOS requirements taken into consideration. At the conclusion of the wargame, or another specified time, the convoy

planner should review the new movement tables and timelines with representatives from all the staff to verify composition and location within the convoy.

As stated, activities at and around the release point cause considerable turbulence to the movement plan. If the unit is immediately deploying into a potential combat situation, it is useful to have a brigade C^2 node with redundant communications to the tactical commander on the ground and to the start point C^2 node. The RP C^2 node will be able to guide the flow of units from the SP based on backlogs, traffic jams, or enemy activity through constant communication with the SP C^2 node. Enroute Traffic Control Points should have communications with both start and release point CPs.

27. ***Identifying, analyzing, and evaluating strengths and weaknesses of the COA***.

Commander's Guidance notes usually provide a number of factors to consider in evaluating a given COA. A good relative combat power analysis should also provide the staff with significant factors to consider. In terms of the wargame, it is imperative that if the COA shows itself to be unfeasible, it must immediately be changed or dropped from consideration. Evaluation of your weaknesses will help the S-2 identify a better enemy most dangerous course of action. It will also confirm whether or not your COA is taking risk where the commander was willing to assume risk. (See Step 1.)

The staff must all understand not only *where* risk is being taken, but also *what* risk is being taken. This knowledge will allow them to plan mitigating actions as appropriate, so they can lessen the risk. A stated risk that is ignored by the staff will be the risk that jumps up and bites you in your rear end.

28. ***Integrating the targeting process, to include identifying or confirming high payoff targets and determining attack guidance***.

The targeting process is not a substitute for the MDMP, but it is an integral sub-process on how we conduct action, reaction, and counteraction throughout the wargame. **FM 6-20-10,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process,*** is an excellent reference. D^3A (decide, detect, deliver, assess) happens throughout the MDMP, with the planning peaking during the wargame. Unfortunately, we normally see a shallow Mission Analysis and incomplete wargame. One of the first elements to drop from a wargame is the deliberate integration of D^3A. Common sense and doctrine both show that the wargame and targeting meeting should be done as one, to both save time and be more fully synchronized. However, if a staff realizes they have not thought through targeting, they may need to conduct a follow-on targeting or synchronization meeting to correct this key deficiency. Collection assets must be tied into deliver assets, and this, in turn, generates taskings. Triggers must be established. All of this must be tied into the scheme of maneuver. Just as importantly, this information must be issued to subordinates in a clear, concise, timely manner that fits in with guidance you have already issued

Here are some techniques to better integrate D^3A into your plan.

A. The brigade targeting officer is an ideal recorder to fill in the Attack Guidance Matrix before and during the wargame. Based on discussion, he should be able to pull out data that he needs. If the XO brings a critical event to a close and aspects of D^3A have not been answered, the Targeting Officer brings that question up for clarification. In this sense, he becomes a "fail-safe" check.

B. ***High Payoff Targets (HPTs)*** *("A target whose loss to the threat will contribute to the success of the friendly COA."* FM 101-5-1(there is a great definition!)) are tied very closely to PIR and NAIs *(decide and detect).* Destroying a designated HPT *(deliver)* will not only seriously hurt the enemy commander, but also it is usually a good indicator of the enemy commander's selected COA. The system or soldiers that detected the HPT during the battle are probably also the best suited to *assess* the target. (***Note:*** The last statement may not always be true, and should be considered thoroughly if the commander has stated that he must have an assessment on a given HPT.) The Commander's requirements on specific assessments may warrant a specific task in the coordinating instructions to report the destruction of "X."

C. It is usually best to develop the D^3A plan based on a coherent brigade scheme of maneuver that focuses on the doctrinal battlefield framework. During the wargame, the S-2 or designated collection manager must advise the targeting team on the ability of available collection systems to acquire, identify, track, and assess BDA on HPTs. Too often, units build a plan (especially in continuous operations) based on sitting around the AGM and filling in blanks, then developing a fragmentary order (FRAGO). That is a bad thing, because it leads to not only looking at the brigade fight as a whole, but it also leaves multi-BOS attacks out of the equation, and it becomes a surrogate for the MDMP (it skips most steps and focuses on just one product of the wargame). This is not to say that a focused Targeting Meeting does not have its uses; it should be fully integrated into the MDMP.

29. *Synchronizing smoke operations.*

Smoke is available to the brigade from three primary sources: the chemical platoon, indirect fires, and CLV carried by soldiers. Each has associated strengths and weaknesses that the planners should consider when they select areas to be smoked. Some doctrinal comments from **FM 7-30, *The Infantry Brigade,*** include, "*The brigade employs two categories of smoke, hasty and deliberate. Hasty smoke is employed for short-term requirements with a minimum of planning. It can be delivered by all smoke assets, but it is normally delivered by artillery, mortars, and smoke pots. Deliberate smoke is characterized by integrated planning. It is used over extended periods to cover friendly activities throughout an entire operation…normally produced by mechanical generators and smoke pots."* On page 8-18, the FM defines the four applications of smoke (obscuration, screening, deception, and identification or signaling), which are worthy of review. Further discussion is in **FM 3-50, *Smoke Operations,*** pages 7 and 13.

A common trend noted at the JRTC is that the breaching fundamentals, SOSR (suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce), get ignored more often than not. **FM 90-13-1, *Combined Arms Breaching Operations,*** is an excellent source for information on both smoke and some typically associated operations that consume planners. Although the breach is the event commonly associated with SOSR, SOSR applies to most parts of a given scheme of maneuver. The beauty of SOSR is that it provides a planning consideration guideline, or foundation, for approaching a brigade attack in both macro and micro scale.

First, it is essential to understand what SOSR means. Using **FM 101-5-1** definitions:

SUPPRESSION: *"A tactical task to employ direct or indirect fires, electronic attack, or smoke on enemy personnel, weapons, or equipment to prevent or degrade enemy fires and observation of the friendly forces."*

OBSCURATION: *"The effects of weather, battlefield dust, and debris, or the use of smoke munitions to hamper observation and target acquisition capability or to conceal activities or movement."*



SECURE: *"A tactical task to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to deploy in a manner which prevents its destruction or loss to enemy action. The attacking force may or may not have to physically occupy the area."*

REDUCE: *"1. A tactical task to gain control over an enemy position or objective."* and *"2. A task to create lanes through or over an obstacle sufficient to allow the attacking force to accomplish its mission."*

During mission analysis, various staff officers will be able to assess smoke capabilities and limitations, such as available munitions, area coverage capabilities and associated time factors, equipment or munitions requirements to make obscuration happen at likely points on the battlefield. During COA development of these planning factors get built into the COA as ways to reduce tactical risk (deny the enemy visibility, protect the force, deceive the enemy). The common problem in field planning is that synchronization of smoke is far from complete at this stage and is often just a general concept.

COA analysis preparation is where the staff earns its money on this issue. Once the smoke provider (FSO, Chemical Officer, or other) understands the maneuver requirements, the chemical officer (as the chief of smoke in the TOC) must do his homework. First he must be able to clearly articulate the purpose behind the smoke requirement at every point needed. It must be expressed in terms of its desired effects on the enemy and acceptable degradation of friendly units. Once the purpose of smoke is understood, he determines details. Who is commander of the ground tactical plan the smoke mission will support? Who will operate the smoke control point to adjust the smoke on target? What resources must be at the smoke control point to ensure the OIC can communicate with *all* the smoke assets and the ground unit commander? How do we plan for 360-degree coverage to ensure success when the wind changes? How long of a smoke duration over how large an area is needed? How many rounds of projected smoke, gallons of fog oil, or number of smoke pots are required to accomplish the mission? How long will it take for the smoke to build to an acceptable level? How does the smoke asset move into the position required to lay smoke? Are these assets integrated into the maneuver movement plan? What is the command and support relationship, and will it change during mission execution? Are specific graphic control measures needed? Will resupply of smoke munitions be required? What redundancy can be built into the plan? Is the smoke asset vulnerable to enemy attack, and, if so, what force protection measures can be implemented to safeguard the force? What are follow-on smoke requirements, does the smoke provider need to move, do they need resupply, and how long will it take? What other staff sections must be coordinated with to lay the groundwork for synchronization *before* the wargame? Do not forget that obscurants do not just affect the enemy -- they can also obscure friendly observation and target acquisition, as well as degrade command and control. Some general planning guidelines for smoke employment are:

A. Smoke is not armor and will not stop bullets or artillery. To lessen this risk, smoke area coverage must be larger than the enemy ability to saturate the area with firepower. FM 3-50 recommends a minimum smoke area of five times larger than the objective.

B. Vary the time and location of smoke to counter registered enemy indirect fires, final protective fires or enemy range cards. For example, start the smoke 30 minutes to an hour early and do not position the friendly force exactly in the middle of the smoke cloud.

C. If the friendly force is critical to the commander, you must integrate multiple smoke assets to ensure success. This means having Class III and V resupply, all smoke generators, pre-planned fire missions, and smoke

pots available and able to be adjusted at the smoke control point. This will allow for enemy activity, longer duration mission than anticipated, and changes in weather.

D. Doctrinally, smoke platoons do not execute smoke missions below platoon level. Without the entire platoon, there is no security, redundancy, command and control, smoke control point or resupply. If the smoke must be used below platoon level, determine who will provide these requirements for the squad or section to ensure success.

If the staff does their homework before the wargame, they will be able to quickly discuss related issues as it pertains to action, reaction, and counteraction. This will further allow the staff to focus on fine-tuning and adjusting the plan to accommodate the required actions. If the data is not developed before the wargame, the staff will either become bogged down in working out details as a group, or (more likely) they will assume away issues. The statement, *"Assumptions make an amateur of you and me,"* as it applies here, is very true. It also kills soldiers.

30. ***Identifying additional hazards, assessing their risk, developing control measures to reduce risk from all identified hazards, and determining residual risk***.

(See Steps 3, 5, 13, 15, 18, 23, 27, and 28 for related material.) The first rule to understand is that risk assessment is part and parcel of the entire MDMP. Where does the commander assume risk? What is the risk he is assuming? What risk does each staff member propose when he suggests a particular COA for employment of assets? There are tactical trade-offs for every decision we make. Our job is to identify those trade-offs early, analyze them, and then incorporate risk reduction (a.k.a. force protection) into our plan. Risk should be thought of both from a tactical point of view as well as from the more formal risk assessment, complete with mitigating factors.

Another way of looking at risk is to consider what the relative combat power analysis is all about. The RCPA helps the commander apply his strength against enemy weakness, and protect his weakness from enemy strength. It should consider maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. How can we combine these elements of combat power together so we have the most efficient success coupled with minimizing losses?

CONCLUSION:

To be effective, staffs must be trained in a crawl, walk, run methodology. The Commander should be integrated into this training whenever and wherever possible, in terms of his role in the MDMP and in terms of his explaining what he expects the staff to do for him. The XO and S-3 must both assume the role of primary trainers and work both one-on-one and collectively with subsets of the staff as well as with the complete staff.

No professional staff member conducts MDMP with the intent to fail in the planning role. Still, until the staff officer or NCO understands the steps of the MDMP and knows what standards are expected of him, he will continuously do less than should be done. He will be unprepared to address issues within the MDMP to the desired degree of detail. This is an education problem that can be fixed with continuous, planned garrison training, supplemented by computer simulations, and culminating in free-play field training exercises and combat training center (CTC) rotations.✪

The Task Force XO: *Roles and Responsibilities*

by LTC Juan Hernandez (formerly O/C, T02, CMTC

This article will help you, the Task Force XO, prepare for CMTC by providing tasks that focus your efforts during a rotation. The tasks describe the XO's job in his dual role as:

- **The battalion or task force's Chief of Staff.**
- **The Chief Logistician.**

This article defines the doctrinal responsibilities of the XO and reviews the XO's duties both as the Chief of Staff and the Chief Logistician. It is based on recent lessons learned for both High Intensity Conflict and Peace Support Rotations at CMTC. The article lists key functions that ultimately contribute to a Task Force (TF)'s success and directs you to readily available publications to better prepare you to execute as the TF XO. As a result, you will be better able to efficiently manage what little time you have during your missions in "the box."

XO Responsibilities:

The ***Commander's Battle Staff Handbook***[1] describes the XO's combat responsibilities as:

- **Establishing staff operating procedures.**
- **Ensuring the commander and the staff are informed on matters affecting the command.**
- **Assembling and supervising the staff during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), ensuring a coordinated, synchronized plan.**
- **Establishing timelines (1/3-2/3).**
- **Establishing the required liaison.**
- **Ensuring information flow between the staff and commander on staff recommendations and the commander's decisions.**
- **Representing the commander (when required) and supervising the main CP and its operations.**
- **Monitoring the overall battle and supervision planning of future operations.**
- **Directing the staff.**
- **Displacing the main CP.**
- **Enforcing SOPs.**
- **Providing for battalion logistical support.**

First Things First. **Find out from the battalion commander how he intends to use the XO.** "The commander may use the XO to operate the unit's main CP…or supervise the overall logistical effort. He must decide how he can use the XO most effectively given individual staff strengths, mission requirements and METT-T, and then communicate his intentions clearly."[2] Therefore, some questions that you must ask well before ever coming to the CMTC are:

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[1] ***Commander's Battle Staff Handbook,*** U.S. Army Research Institute, Fort Benning Field Unit, 15 May 93, p. 2-3.
[2] Ibid., p. 2.

- **What is my battalion commander's command philosophy?**
- **What is my commander's intent and guidance?**
- **How does the battalion commander plan to use me?**
- **What are my responsibilities in TOC operations?**
- **What is my relationship to the S3?**
- **What is my decisionmaking authority for the commander/command structure?**

The answers to these questions provide the groundwork for you to decide how you want to allocate your time and effort to being the Chief of Staff and Chief Logistician.

XO as Chief of Staff

The XO is the principal agent responsible for synchronizing the entire battle staff. The XO:

- **Orchestrates each step of the MDMP.**
- **Ensures staff integration throughout the planning, preparation and execution phases of the operation.**
- **Enforces the timeline.**

Using the Plan/Prep/Execute methodology, key functions of the XO are:

Plan

- **Chief of Staff during the MDMP. Two sources to help you do your job are CALL Newsletter No. 93-3,[3] and No. 95-12.[4]**
- **XO as keeper of the timeline.**
  - ➜ **Upon receipt of the Bde FRAGO, publish the timeline for the operation. *Post for all in the TOC to see. Update as required!***
  - ➜ **Include all rehearsals (fires, TF, CSS, Bde-level) in the timeline.**
  - ➜ **Most importantly, enforce the timeline.**
    - ✯ **Once enforced, the battlestaff will live by it.**
    - ✯ **You're the guy with the club to beat up those that stray out of line.**

Prepare

- **Quality control for OPORD and graphics.**
- **Rehearsals.**
  - ➜ **It's the commander's rehearsal, but you run it.**
  - ➜ **Don't let it turn into a wargame.**
  - ➜ **Rehearse the rehearsal with the battle staff.**
  - ➜ **Keep the rehearsal length to an hour or less.**
  - ➜ **Maintain the standard defined in CALL Newsletter No. 91-1.[5]**
- **Review the OPORD for quality control. Again, as in the rehearsal, rehearse the OPORD.**

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[3] **CALL Newsletter No. 93-3, *The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff,*** TRADOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Jul 93.
[4] **CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, *Tactical Deicsion Making: Abbreviated Planning,*** TRADOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Dec 95.
[5] **CALL Newsletter No. 91-1, *Rehearsals,*** TRADOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Apr 91.

Execute

● **During the battle, ensure crosstalk laterally (Co/Tms) and higher/lower (Bde/Bn).**

● **Ensure that your battle staff is drilled to the point that it can analyze, develop, synchronize and recommend a course of action within minutes of receiving a FRAGO from the TF Commander or Brigade.**

● **Know the Rules of Engagement!**

XO as Chief Logistician

"The TF XO is the most critical player on the CSS team.

■ **Synchronizes all staff actions to support the mission.**

■ **Must know the functions and responsibilities of the CSS team.** Refer to the following articles:

➜ **Effectively supervise them on the battlefield.** See **"Techniques for Sustaining Your Task Force,"** ***Armor,*** Mar-Apr 94, pp. 18-20.

➜ **"Regenerating Combat Power at the NTC,"** ***Armor,*** Jan-Feb 96, pp. 6-12.

TF CSS Rehearsals are probably the most important. They ensure complete synchronization and understanding of the TF CSS Concept of Support. Units coming to the CMTC typically do this poorly. The result is an unsynchronized CSS plan that does not support the TF. See **CALL Newsletter No. 91-1, *Rehearsals,*** Apr 91.

The functions listed below are CSS areas that traditionally demand the XO's attention during a rotation. They frequently become the topic of an AAR/a Hot Wash point:

● **Logistic integration into the MDMP.**
● **CSS integration of attached units into the Task Force.**
● **In paragraph 4 of the OPORD.** ***Who checks the CSS plan for completeness and synchronization?***
● **Is the TF Concept of Support synchronized with the Bde Concept of Support?**
● **CSS Rehearsals.**
● **LOGPAC operations (plan/prep/execute).**
● **CTCP and FTCP SOPs and operations.**
● **Maintenance:**
  ➜ **Circle X and Deadline Criteria in the Task Force.**
  ➜ **Who in the TF has Circle X authority?**
  ➜ **Cross-leveling within the Task Force.**
  ➜ **SOPs.**
  ➜ **Daily PMCS/5988-E turn-in. How many are being submitted versus the TF vehicle density?**
  ➜ **Daily Class IX requisitions.**
  ➜ **Disk turn-in due to the absence of e-mail or the Electronic Logistics System (ELS).**
  ➜ **PLL management.**
  ➜ **Recovery operations.**
  ➜ **Full-Up Power Pack (FUPP) availability.**
  ➜ **Battalion representation at the daily BSA tenant meetings and Bde-level CSS rehearsals.**
● **Personnel Accountability.**
● **Processing 1156 Casualty Feeder Reports for all casualties.**
● **MEDEVAC and CASEVAC procedures.**

- **Combat Lifesavers and Combat Lifesaver Bags in the Task Force.**
- **Field Sanitation.**
- **Reconstitution procedures.**

CASEVAC planning and execution always challenge units coming to the CMTC. Failure to plan and synchronize CASEVAC and the improper positioning of treatment assets result in an inability to evacuate casualties from point of injury to treatment facility in a timely manner. The ultimate result is that soldiers die of wounds. Nonstandard evacuation platforms, certified combat lifesavers in all platoons and thorough rehearsals during the preparation phase at the Co/Tm and Task Force levels are the key to reducing died of wounds rates during a rotation.

Conclusion

Use this summary of tasks to prepare for your next rotation. The preparation will focus your efforts, enable you to more efficiently manage what little time you have during missions in "the box" and ultimately succeed in operations ranging from Peace Support to High Intensity Conflict.✪